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ABSTRACT 
 
A challenge that corporate managers face is how to enhance the credibility of their good news 
earnings forecasts. In the first part of my dissertation, I review the literature on two-sided 
advertisement from the marketing literature and the literature on management credibility in 
accounting. I also explain how the two-sided advertising literature and the prior credibility 
framework can serve as the basis for my predictions in my experimental study about a 
mechanism to enhance management forecast credibility. 
In the second part of the dissertation, I experimentally test and find evidence that managers can 
enhance their forecast credibility by supplementing their good news forecasts with downside 
information.  I also document the boundary conditions of the credibility enhancement by the 
disclosure of downside information.  First, I predict and find that the credibility-enhancing effect 
of the downside supplementary information is moderated by the extent to which investors 
perceive managers can control the factors described in the downside information.  My results 
also suggest that investors’ perceptions of managements’ forthcomingness mediate the influences 
of perceived management controllability on investors’ forecast credibility judgments.  Second, I 
predict and find some support that the credibility-enhancing effect is moderated by the proximity 
of the downside information to the good news forecast.  Overall, I add to the literature by 
showing that managers can use a mechanism – namely, supplementing a good news forecast with 
downside information – to enhance the credibility of the good news forecast. My findings are 
important given that managers desire to understand factors that individually and collectively 
enhance the credibility of their disclosures.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Management earnings forecasts are one of the important types of voluntary disclosure 
mechanisms that provide information about expected performance of a firm (e.g., Cotter, Tuna 
and Wysocki 2006).  Prior research indicates that a management forecast can reduce information 
asymmetry between management and investors (e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997).  The reduced 
information asymmetry is likely to increase future liquidity of the firms’ stocks, and 
consequently leads to a lower cost of capital and enhanced corporate investment and growth 
(e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Healy, Hutton and Palepu 1999).  Therefore, managers 
have incentives to effectively communicate their expectations of firms’ future performance to the 
market.  However, extensive evidence indicates that managers face a real challenge to issue 
credible good news forecasts (e.g., Hutton, Miller and Skinner 2003; Rogers and Stocken 2005; 
Ng, Tuna and Verdi 2008).  Thus, it is not surprising that managers strive to increase their 
forecast credibility.   
In this dissertation, I propose a mechanism that management can use to enhance the 
credibility of a good news forecast.  This dissertation consists of five chapters.  Chapter 2 first 
reviews two-sided research in marketing literature and explains this area of marketing literature 
can serve as an avenue into management disclosure literature in accounting research.  Then 
Chapter 2 continues with a review on prior credibility frameworks of management disclosures in 
accounting literature and articulates how these frameworks map into the theoretical model I use 
as the basis for my study.  
  In Chapter 3, I use an experiment to examine a mechanism, supplementing a good news 
forecast with downside information, for managers to more credibly communicate good news 
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forecasts.  Guided by attribution theory in psychology, I predict and find that the credibility of a 
good news forecast will be enhanced when managers supplement the good news forecast with 
downside information, as compared to upside information or no supplementary information.   
  Chapter 3 continues with investigating the boundary conditions of the credibility 
enhancement of downside information. I predict that the credibility-enhancing effect from this 
mechanism depends on the extent to which investors perceive managers can control the factors 
discussed in the downside supplementary information.  My results suggest that investors’ 
credibility judgments are enhanced when the downside information describes factors that are 
perceived to be less controllable, but not when they are perceived to be more controllable by 
management.  In addition, the path analyses suggest that investors’ judgments of management’s 
forthcomingness mediate the influence of supplementary information controllability on their 
forecast credibility judgments.   
 In Chapter 4, I further investigate the boundary conditions by testing whether the 
credibility enhancement depends on the proximity of downside information to the good news 
forecast.  I find some evidence that downside information in close proximity, as opposed to in 
distant proximity, is more likely to enhance the credibility of a good news forecast.  However, 
the credibility judgments are not significantly different between participants in the close 
proximity and those in the distant proximity conditions.  Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by 
summarizing the findings, acknowledging limitations, and providing suggestions for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
REVIEW OF TWO-SIDED DISCLOSURE AND  
MANAGEMENT FORECAST CREDIBILITY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the background literature for this study.  First, 
I review research on two-sided advertisements from the marketing literature.  A two-sided 
advertisement voluntarily disclaims particular characteristics of a product in conjunction with 
asserting positive claims in one advertisement, while a one-sided advertisement consists of only 
positive claims about a product.  I also explain why this area of marketing literature can serve as 
a springboard to management disclosure literature in accounting research.  Second, I review 
prior research on management forecast credibility.  Specifically, I elaborate on prior credibility 
frameworks, explain how the literature defines the constructs associated with credibility (e.g., 
forthcomingness, competence, trustworthiness, management credibility, and management 
disclosure credibility), and articulate how these frameworks map into the theoretical model I use 
as the basis for my predictions in this dissertation.  
2.2 Two-Sided Research in Marketing Literature 
 
Advertisers typically present their products favorably to consumers.  However, 
advertisers sometimes disclose negative information in addition to positive information about 
their products (Eisend 2007).  A stream of research in marketing suggests that (in some 
situations) this strategy can be more persuasive than providing only positive information 
(Pechmann 1990; Crowley and Hoyer 1994).   This is particularly true when consumers already 
hold negative beliefs or attitudes about a brand, or when they will likely be exposed to 
unfavorable information about the product from competitors or other independent sources 
(Eisend 2007).  
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In this section, I first introduce the theories that have been applied to develop two-sided 
research in marketing. I then discuss the common structure of a two-sided advertisement. Next, I 
review the observed findings of two-sided studies in marketing research. Lastly, I discuss how 
this two-sided technique can be applied to management forecasts in an accounting setting (For a 
full review of two-sided research in marketing, please see Crowley and Hoyer 1994; Eisend 
2007).     
2.2.1 Theories and Two-Sided Research 
Researchers in marketing have borrowed theories from psychology (i.e., attribution 
theory, optimal arousal theory, and inoculation theory) to understand the mechanisms underlying 
two-sided advertisements (c.f., Crowley and Hoyer 1994; Eisend 2007).  Both inoculation theory 
and attribution theory have been applied in developing predictions for two-sided research; while 
optimal arousal theory has been introduced to the two-sided literature to explain some aspects of 
the two-sided effect (Eisend 2007). 
2.2.1.1 Attribution Explanations for Two-Sided Effect  
Attribution theory explains how individuals impute causes to an event (Jones and Davis 
1965; Kelley 1972; Fiske and Taylor 1991).  When a situational incentive is apparent, the cause 
of an individual’s behavior will more likely be attributed to the incentive (e.g., speaking 
positively about their products).  Otherwise, the cause of the behavior will more likely be 
attributed to an individual’s dispositional characteristics (e.g., being forthcoming about negative 
features of their products).  Attribution theory has guided most two-sided studies in marketing 
literature (e.g., Settle and Golden 1974; Golden and Alpert 1987; Kamins and Marks 1987; 
Kamins 1989; Eisend, Hahn and Schuchert-Guler 2004).   
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Panel A of Figure 1 summarizes how attribution theory can be applied to describe the 
effect of a two-sided message in marketing literature (see Crowley and Hoyer 1994; Eisend 
2007).  The attribution theory model suggests that the voluntary inclusion of negative 
information in an advertisement is not compatible with an advertiser’s incentives, thereby 
leading an information recipient to perceive higher credibility of the advertiser for telling the 
truth (Link A of Panel A in Figure 1).  This enhanced perception of advertiser credibility, in turn, 
strengthens favorable beliefs about the advertiser (Link B).  Consequently, the enhanced attitude 
towards the advertiser enhances the attitude towards the advertisement (Link C) and the brand 
(Link D) (see Panel A of Figure 1).   
While attribution theory provides a plausible explanation for the credibility enhancement 
resulting from a two-sided advertising, Crowley and Hoyer (1994) argue that this theory provides 
little insight about the overall persuasiveness of the message.  First, the presence of negative 
information in the advertisement could lead to negative attitudes towards the product, which 
could potentially offset the gains in credibility.  Secondly, the theory provides no guidance 
regarding the structure of a two-sided message except that a negative attribute should be included 
(Crowley and Hoyer 1994). Due to these limitations of the attribution model, Crowley and Hoyer 
(1994) introduce optimal arousal theory into the two-sided literature.   
2.2.1.2  Optimal Arousal Explanations for Two-Sided Effect 
Optimal arousal theory (Berlyne 1971) posits that people perform better at a moderate 
level of arousal.  The extent of arousal is based on a range of deviation from the adaptation 
level.
1
  Large deviation from the adaptation level leads to negative affect, while minor deviation 
from the adaptation level (either a little more or a little less) generates positive affect (Crowley 
                                                 
1
 Adaptation level refers to "some kind of stimulation that the organism has been receiving in the recent past or is 
for some other reason expecting‖ (Berlyne 1971, p. 90). 
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and Hoyer 1994).  Though optimal arousal theory has not been applied in two-sided research, 
Crowley and Hoyer (1994) suggest that optimal arousal theory can add to our understanding of 
some aspects of two-sided communication.    
Panel B of Figure 1 describes the application of optimal arousal theory in two-sided 
literature (see Crowley and Hoyer 1994; Eisend 2007).  Negative claims in a two-sided 
advertisement will be perceived to be pleasingly novel (Link A of Panel B of Figure 1) since a 
one-sided message may represent the adaptation level (i.e., the type of communication that the 
information recipient is expecting). The ―pleasing novelty‖ in a two-sided message may enhance 
attention and motivation to process the message (Link B of Panel B of Figure 1), which in turn 
generates a positive attitude towards the advertisement (Link C of Panel B of Figure 1).  The 
―pleasing novelty‖ also directly creates a positive attitude towards the advertisement (Link D of 
Panel B of Figure 1).  The enhanced attention and motivation to the message (Link E of Panel B 
of Figure 1) and the enhanced attitude towards the advertisement (Link F of Panel B of Figure 1) 
will likely increase the probability of a favorable attitude toward the brand (Eisend 2007).  
Although optimal arousal theory could potentially provide plausible explanations about 
the two-sided effect, Eisend (2007) questions the validity of the model.  He bases his concerns on 
the most recent research findings in the processing fluency studies and associative network 
models, which suggest a negative relationship between perceived novelty and attitude changes 
(Eisend 2007).    
2.2.1.3 Inoculation Explanations for Two-Sided Effect  
Inoculation theory, developed by McGuire (1961), states that voluntarily supplying 
negative information makes the recipients more resistant to subsequent attacks from other 
parties.  Panel C of Figure 1 describes the application of inoculation theory in two-sided 
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literature, which involves voluntarily including mild negative arguments along with positive 
arguments and then discounting or refuting these negative arguments within the same 
communication (see Crowley and Hoyer 1994; Eisend 2007).  According to the theory, the 
recipient of such a two-sided message has already encountered a negative but refuted argument.  
Therefore, the recipient is less likely to believe a subsequent negative argument from a third 
party and more likely to form supporting responses to the positive arguments in the original two-
sided message (Crowley and Hoyer 1994).   
The inoculation model suggests that a two-sided message enhances attention and 
motivation to process a message (Link A of Panel C in Figure 1), thereby enhancing positive 
cognitive responses (Link B and D of Panel C in Figure 1) and decreasing negative cognitive 
responses (Link C and E of Panel C in Figure 1), which in turn, enhance the favorable attitude 
(Link F of Panel C in Figure 1) or decrease the negative attitude towards the brand, respectively 
(Link G of Panel C in Figure 1).   
Though McGuire (1961) has found the tactic of a two-sided message with refutation to be 
effective, only a few studies in two-sided persuasion research are based on inoculation theory 
(Sawyer 1973; Etgar and Goodwin 1982).  Furthermore, Crowley and Hoyer (1994) argue that 
the theory is merely descriptive because it does not provide a causal mechanism underlying two-
sided effects.  They also criticize the theory for not providing guidance on how to effectively 
form a two-sided message (e.g., the amount and the importance of negative information that 
should be included in a two-sided message) (Crowley and Hoyer 1994). 
2.2.1.4 Implication of Discussed Theories  
Although all three theories predict that two-sided messages can be more effective for 
persuasion than one-sided messages, attribution theory remains the basis for the majority of 
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studies (Crowley and Hoyer 1994; Eisend 2007).   Based on the alternative theories, Crowley 
and Hoyer (1994) develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the 
persuasive mechanisms underlying two-sided messages.  Subsequently, Eisend (2007) 
empirically tests the propositions based on the alternative theories and the integrative framework 
provided by Crowley and Hoyer (1994).  He provides empirical evidence to show that attribution 
theory provides the higher model fit than inoculation theory and optimal arousal theory in 
explaining the effect of two-sided advertisements.  All causal relationships (Panel A of Figure 1) 
are significant and reflect directions assumed by attribution theory, while the models based on 
optimal arousal theory (Panel B of Figure 1) and inoculation theory (Panel C of Figure 1) are 
only partly supported (Eisend 2007).   
2.2.2 Structure of Two-Sided Message  
  Most two-sided research focused only on the effect of the presence or absence of two-
sided information.  Crowley and Hoyer (1994) expand on this by summarizing the importance of 
message factors, such as the amount of negative information, order of information presentation, 
importance of the negative information, refutation of the negative information, and correlation 
between positive and negative information.  
2.2.2.1  Amount of Negative Information   
  Prior research indicates that the proportion of negative information in a two-sided 
communication influences the two-sided effect (Golden and Alpert 1987).  Golden and Alpert 
(1987) examine the two-sided effect by varying the amount of negative information included in 
the advertisement.  Their findings suggest that an advertiser could reap the maximum benefit of 
two-sided communication when the advertisement consists of 40% negative information. This 
also explains why positive affect is observed in two-sided studies with the amount of negative 
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information below 40% but not in those with negative information above 40%.   Crowley and 
Hoyer (1994) indicate that extreme amounts of negative information could lead to very low 
believability and negative brand attitudes (e.g., Kirmani and Wright 1986). Crowley and Hoyer 
(1994) further suggest that one important negative attribute represents relatively ―more‖ negative 
information than one unimportant negative attribute.   
2.2.2.2 Order of Information Presentation   
  Prior research also indicates that the placement of negative information matters in a two-
sided message (Hass and Linder 1972; Kamins and Mark 1987; Hastak and Park 1990) because 
the order in which the recipient receives and processes negative and positive information affects 
the two-sided effectiveness (Crowley and Hoyer 1994).  Placing negative information too early 
in the message undermines the two-sided effectiveness because of the primacy effect (Asch 
1952).  The negative information placed at the very beginning of a two-sided message may lead 
to a negative first impression (Hastak and Park 1990).  Due to the recency effect, if the negative 
information is placed too late in the message, the recipient will focus on the negative information, 
which leads to the loss of the two-sided benefits (e.g., credibility enhancement and pleasing 
novelty).   
  Crowley and Hoyer (1994) propose placing negative information early in the message but 
not first.  Findings from two studies validate their proposal.  Specifically, Kamins and Marks 
(1987), placing negative information in the middle of the message, find significantly higher 
credibility and brand attitude for the two-sided conditions.  On the other hand, Hastak and Park 
(1990), placing the negative information first, find no positive impact of a two-sided message.
2
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The two studies are exactly the same except for the placement of negative information.  
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2.2.2.3 Importance of Negative Information   
The importance of negative information impacts the effectiveness of a two-sided message 
(Stayman, Hoyer and Leone 1987).  Credibility of the advertiser increases with the importance of 
the negative attributes.  However, when a very important attribute was discounted, the negative 
information may dominate recipients’ attention and the detrimental effect may offset the 
credibility gains.  Discounting unimportant attributes does not lead to the two-sided benefit either 
(Stayman et al. 1987).  Therefore, Crowley and Hoyer (1994) suggests that the negative 
attributes contained in a two-sided message should be of low to moderate importance in order to 
benefit from the favorable impact of a two-sided message.  
2.2.3.4 Refutation of Negative Information 
Early studies find that discounting the negative information in a two-sided message 
preserve positive attitude towards a product even in the face of subsequent negative claims 
(Bither, Dolich and Nell 1971; Sawyer 1973; Szybillo and Heslin 1973), especially when an 
important negative attribute faces an attack (Sawyer 1973).   
However, more recent research shows that the presence or absence of refutation for 
negative information of low importance has little impact on the two-sided effect (Kamins and 
Assael 1987).  While the presence of a refutational statement may serve to moderate the impact 
of negative information, this refutation may also partially mitigate the desired effects on 
credibility.  Thus refutation is necessary only when the negative information is highly important 
(Crowley and Hoyer 1994).  
2.2.2.5 Correlation between Positive and Negative Information   
Prior research indicates that a two-sided message with correlated (as compared to 
uncorrelated) negative and positive information is more persuasive in strengthening the 
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recipient’s beliefs about the positive information (Etgar and Goodwin 1982; Pechmann 1992).  
Consumers consider an attribute of a product within the context of its relationship with other 
attributes.  Thus, even though most research in two-sided advertising has used uncorrelated 
attributes, Crowley and Hoyer (1994) suggest that two-sided messages should include positive 
and negative attributes that are correlated.  
2.2.3 Findings of Two-sided Research 
Most research on two-sided communications has involved two-sided advertising. On one 
hand, prior research consistently finds that two-sided messages can motivate message recipients 
to attend to and process the message, enhance credibility (Smith and Hunt 1978; Golden and 
Alpert 1987; Kamins and Marks 1987), reduce counterarguments (Belch 1981; Swinyard 1981; 
Kamins and Assael 1987), and generate resistance to subsequent attack (Bither, Szybillo and 
Heslin 1973; Kamins and Assael 1987).  On the other hand, prior research also shows some 
inconsistent findings of two-sided effects in terms of message recipients’ attitude toward the 
advertisement, their attitude toward the brand, and intention to purchase the product.   Prior 
research also demonstrates the importance of the message structure to make a two-sided message 
effective.   
2.2.3.1  Credibility   
Consistent with predictions based on attribution theory, two-sided literature shows that a 
two-sided message can enhance the credibility of the advertiser, which in turn, increases the 
probability of the favorable attitude towards the advertisement and the brand (e.g., Settle and 
Golden 1974; Eisend 2007).  However, the amount of negative information is a key 
consideration in constructing a two-sided message.  Though credibility increases with the 
amount of negative information communicated, the overall effectiveness of a two-sided message 
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may be undermined when the amount of negative information exceeds a ―moderate‖ level (40%).  
This is known as the trade-off phenomenon.  In other words, consumers will believe the negative 
information, and these beliefs will be reflected in their attitude toward the brand, reducing the 
overall favorability of beliefs and thus their attitude toward the brand (Settle and Golden 1974; 
Golden and Alpert 1987).  Therefore, consistent findings indicate that the benefit of enhanced 
credibility can be maintained with the presence of a low to moderate amount of negative 
information (Crowley and Hoyer 1994; Eisend 2007).  
2.2.3.2  Attitude towards the Advertisement and Brand   
Prior two-sided research finds that the enhanced credibility in an advertiser given by a 
two-sided message leads to a positive attitude towards the advertiser and subsequently an 
advertisement (e.g., Eisend 2007).  Prior advertising literature also shows that message recipients’ 
attitude towards an advertisement has an important direct effect on their attitude toward the 
brand and indirect effects through brand cognitions (e.g., Belch 1981; Etgar and Goodwin 1982; 
Brown and Stayman 1992; Eisend 2007).   
Although some empirical evidence shows mixed results regarding attitude towards a two-
sided advertisement and a brand (Stayman, Hoyer and Leone 1987; Kamins 1989), Golden and 
Alpert (1987) indicate that the mixed results are due to the varying amounts of negative 
information. Without the proper amount of negative information, the novelty of a two-sided 
message may be insufficient to translate into positive affective reactions to the message. 
Conversely, if the level of negative information becomes too high, information recipients may 
dislike the message and find it to be too novel (Crowley and Hoyer 1994).  Eisend (2007) finds 
that if a proper amount of negative information is included in a two-sided message, the message 
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recipient will develop a positive attitude towards the advertisement, which in turn leads to a 
positive attitude towards the brand (e.g. Eisend 2007).   
2.2.3.3 Purchase Intention   
Purchase intentions are driven largely by a consumer’s attitude toward a brand, which is 
driven by the perceived credibility of the advertisement and the advertiser, cognitive responses 
toward the advertisement, and attitude toward the advertisement (Crowley and Hoyer 1994). 
Prior research provides mixed results regarding the impact of two-sided messages on purchase 
intentions (e.g, Belch 1981; Golden and Alpert 1987; Eisend 2007).  Belch (1981) finds no 
significant two-sided effect on purchase attention. However, Golden and Alpert (1987) and 
Eisend (2007) show an enhanced purchase intention in the presence of a low-to-moderate 
amount of negative information.  These empirical results suggest that a proper amount of 
negative information can enhance purchase intention.  Once again, the findings show the 
importance of the structure of a two-sided message (e.g., amount of negative information) for 
two-sided effectiveness.  
2.2.3.4 Attention and Motivation to Process   
Several prior findings suggest that recipients of a two-sided advertisement process and 
attend to two-sided advertisements to a greater extent than a one-sided advertisement (e.g., 
greater temporal persistence in Faison 1961 and more resistance to subsequent counterattitudinal 
advertising messages in Bither et al. 1971) than attitudes based on one-sided advertisements.  
Crowley and Hoyer (1994) suggest that optimal arousal theory offers a plausible rationale for 
these findings.  Recall that optimal arousal theory suggests that when a message becomes more 
unique, novel, or interesting (up to a point), the message recipient may be more motivated to 
attend to and process the message. Thus, Crowley and Hoyer (1994) call for a formal test to 
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show that the consumer’s motivation to attend to and process a two-sided message is increased 
because of the perceived novelty of the two-sided message, as predicted by optimal arousal 
theory.  Eisend (2007) provides empirical evidence that there is enhanced motivation to attend to 
and process a two-sided message; however, the enhanced motivation is not due to the perceived 
novelty of the two-sided message.  In fact, he finds that the novelty has a negative impact on the 
motivation of the recipients to process a two-sided message. Therefore, it remains an open 
question about what causes the increased motivation to attend to and process a two-sided 
message.  
2.2.3.5  Cognitive Response  
 Prior studies in two-sided advertising indicate a reduction in negative cognitive 
responses (in terms of counterargumentation) in response to two-sided messages (Belch 1981; 
Swinyard 1981; Kamins and Assael 1987).  Crowley and Hoyer (1994) propose two causes for 
this decrease in counterarguments. First, information recipients are less likely to counterargue 
with a message they believe and like. Thus, the level of counterargumentation decreases as 
advertiser credibility is enhanced (attribution theory) and the attitude toward the advertisement is 
more favorable (optimal arousal theory). Second, two-sided messages contain ―built-in‖ 
counterarguements in the form of negative information. This may also serve to reduce the 
consumer’s motivation to counterargue. Positive cognitive responses should increase due, in part, 
to positive attribution about the credibility of the source of the message.  
2.2.4 Two-sided Effect and Management Earnings Forecast 
Recall that Eisend (2007) provides empirical evidence that attribution theory better 
explains the mechanisms of two-sided persuasion in marketing.  He hypothesizes and finds that 
two-sided disclosures enhances source credibility, which in turn enhances recipients’ attitude 
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toward the advertiser, and consequently enhances the attitude toward the advertisement and the 
brands (Eisend 2007).  Attribution theory has also been applied in accounting disclosure research 
to study the credibility of accounting disclosures. The only paper which introduces two-sided 
disclosure into accounting research is Winchel (2007).  In an analyst recommendation setting, 
Winchel (2007) suggests that investors view favorable analysts’ reports as more credible when 
negative argumentations are provided along with positive argumentations (two-sided disclosure), 
compared to those who receive only positive argumentations (one-sided disclosure).
3
 Similarly 
two-sided research in marketing, motivated by attribution theory, could also serve as a 
springboard to management disclosures literature in accounting.   
Prior research in advertising and marketing suggests two-sided messages can enhance the 
credibility of the advertiser and the advertisement (Golden and Alpert 1987; Kamins and Marks 
1987), especially when information recipients have already held negative beliefs or attitudes 
about the brand (Golden an Alpert 1987; Sawyer 1973; Shimp 1989).  Similarly, in a 
management disclosure context, management constantly faces challenges toward their 
disclosures from auditors, analysts, investors and even themselves (i.e., restatements).  
Therefore, managers could benefit from the credibility enhancement from providing two-sided 
disclosures (i.e., disclosing negative information and positive information within a same 
disclosure) to market participants.   
Two-sided advertisement can enhance the credibility of the advertiser and the 
advertisement; largely because advertisers are perceived to tell the truth when negative 
information is provided since they are perceived to have incentives to present their products in a 
favorable light.  Along the same line, it is possible that managers can apply two-sided disclosure 
                                                 
3
 However, the two-sided effect is only observed when both one-sided disclosure and two-sided disclosure are 
presented within subject but not when they are presented between subject. 
 16 
in a management disclosure setting.  Managers generally are perceived to have greater incentives 
to provide positive news disclosures than negative news disclosures (McNichols 1989; Dimma 
1996; however, see Aboody and Kasznik 2000).  Prior research in management disclosure has 
suggested that negative news disclosures are expected to be more inherently credible than 
positive news disclosures.  Thus, presenting negative information along with positive 
information could potentially enhance the credibility of management and their disclosures.  
  However, there could be other costs for disclosing negative information; hence, 
implementing the two-sided persuasion mechanism should be considered as only one of the 
many possible inputs of the management decision process.  In addition, the implementation of 
two-sided disclosure should be handled with caution.  As Crowley and Hoyer (1994) have 
outlined, implementing two-sided disclosure should consider the structure of the two-sided 
message.  One potential question in a management setting is to examine how the nature of 
negative information within a two-sided disclosure affects investors’ perceived credibility of 
management and their disclosures.  I address this issue in Chapter 3 by testing whether the 
perceived controllability of the events described in management’s disclosures have any impact 
on the credibility enhancement by a two-sided disclosure.  Another question that could be of 
interest is whether the two-sided effect is influenced by the placement of negative information.  I 
investigate this question in Chapter 4.  Future management disclosure research could also 
investigate how the credibility-enhancement via a two-sided disclosure can translate into 
investment decisions.  
2.3 Management Forecast Credibility 
 
An established literature documents that managers voluntarily disclose information to 
facilitate communication to the market.  Both academic (e.g., Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki 2006) 
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and institutional evidence (NIRI 2009) suggests that managers often issue earnings forecasts to 
communicate their expectation about their firms’ future performance to market participants. 
Prior accounting research suggests that when management is perceived to face greater 
incentives to mislead, their disclosures are less likely to be believed (e.g., Hutton, Miller and 
Skinner 2003; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Ng, Tuna and Verdi 2008).  Specifically, research 
findings show that positive news disclosures tend to be less credible than negative news 
disclosures (Williams 1996; Hutton et al. 2003) and that the disclosures of financially distressed 
firms are less credible than the disclosures of financially sound firms (Frost 1997; Koch 2002).  
In addition, Beniluz (2007) predicts and finds that the more disappointing the earnings 
announcement news, the higher the optimistic bias in the simultaneously released management 
long-horizon forecasts of annual earnings.  The paper also documents that market participants are 
aware, at least to some extent, of management’s tendency to counter disappointing earnings news 
with overly optimistic forecasts. 
On the other hand, existing literature has well documented the importance of credibility 
for management disclosures (Coller and Yohn 1997; Healy et al. 1999; Verrecchia 2001; Francis, 
Lefond, Olsson and Schipper 2004; Ng et al. 2008).  When managers are perceived to be more 
credible, they are better able to communicate information to the capital market (Williams 1996; 
Hirst, Koonce and Miller 1999; Hutton et al. 2003; Mercer 2004).  Existing research on 
management forecast credibility focuses on the consequences of forecast credibility. 
Researchers rarely study how to enhance the credibility of management’s earnings forecast. 
Recent papers that have discussed mechanisms to improve management disclosure credibility 
include Libby and Tan (1999), Tan, Libby and Hunton (2002), Mercer (2005) and Hirst, Koonce, 
and Venkataraman (2007).   
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Mercer (2005) differentiates between the credibility of management and their disclosures. 
She outlines a framework of financial disclosure credibility, upon which I build the theoretical 
model of my study. In the following sections of this chapter, I first introduce Mercer’s (2005) 
credibility frameworks, explain how the literature defines the constructs associated with 
credibility (e.g., forthcomingness, competence, trustworthiness, management credibility, and 
disclosure credibility), and then articulate how these frameworks map into the theoretical model 
I use as the basis for my Chapter 3 predictions.  
2.3.1 Management Credibility Framework: Mercer 2004 and 2005 
  Mercer (2004, 2005) pioneers the management credibility framework by differentiating 
the management credibility from their disclosure credibility. Consistent with previous disclosure 
research (e.g., Jennings 1987), Mercer (2004, 2005) define disclosure credibility as the perceived 
believability of a particular management disclosure.  Mercer provides a model of the 
determinants of disclosure credibility (see Panel A of Figure 2, adapted from Mercer 2004).  She 
states that the perceived credibility of a management’s specific disclosure is determined by 
management’s incentives at the time of the disclosures (Link A), management credibility (Link 
B), the degree of external and internal assurance available (Link C), and the characteristics of the 
disclosure itself (Link D).   
  When managers are perceived to have greater incentives to mislead, information 
recipients are less likely to believe managers’ disclosures (Link A) (Hassell and Jennings 1988; 
Koch 1999).  This is consistent with persuasion models from psychology, which suggests that 
disclosure credibility will be influenced by the perceived incentives of the disclosure source 
(Kelley 1972; Friestad and Wright 1994).  Applying the concept in the context of management 
earnings forecasts, investors are less likely to believe a good news forecast when managers are 
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perceived to have greater incentives to forecast upward after the company just reported poor 
earnings for the past period.   
   Prior psychology research on source credibility suggests that the credibility of a 
disclosure is partly determined by its source’s credibility (Link B) (Hovland, Janis and Kelley 
1953; Griffin 1967; Birnbaum and Stegner 1979).  Based on source credibility literature in 
psychology, Mercer (2004, 2005) defines management credibility as investors’ perception of 
management competence and trustworthiness (Mercer 2004, 2005).  Mercer (2004) is the first 
study to view disclosure credibility and management credibility as independent constructs.  In 
her framework, disclosure credibility is applied to one particular management disclosure, while 
management credibility is an enduring management characteristic.  Management credibility is 
one of the determinants that could affect how investors form their beliefs about the credibility of 
a specific management disclosure. Prior research shows that information recipients are likely to 
view disclosures more credible when they are from more credible managers than less credible 
managers (Williams 1996; Hirst, Koonce and Miller 1999). This line of findings in accounting 
research is consistent with the findings in source credibility research in psychology, which shows 
that source credibility matters in information recipients’ decision making. Mercer (2005) finds 
that the management credibility effects of disclosure do not differ for the two dimensions of 
management credibility (management competence and trustworthiness).  The perceptions of 
competence and trustworthiness often are correlated. Mercer (2004) also suggests that 
management’s disclosure credibility is influenced by how other investors and/or analysts react to 
the disclosure (Link C). However, there is limited evidence on this prediction.  
  The last determinant of disclosure credibility in Mercer’s (2004) framework is the 
characteristics of disclosures (Link D). Mercer (2004) suggests that disclosure credibility is 
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influenced by disclosure format (e.g., point estimate or range estimate), disclosure venue (e.g., 
disclosure in the audited financial statements or meeting with reporters), disclosure horizon (e.g., 
interim earnings forecasts or annual earnings forecasts), presence of supporting explanations 
(e.g., reasons for the revised earnings estimate), and inherent plausibility (e.g., estimates are 
more credible if the disclosure is closer to base-rate performance).   
     Upon building the links between disclosure credibility and its determinants, Mercer (2005) 
develops a theoretical framework and provides experimental evidence on the factors that affect 
management credibility and in turn the credibility of a subsequent disclosure.   Prior accounting 
research provides evidence that managers who previously provide more accurate, complete, or 
timely disclosures are viewed as more credible, at least in the short term (see Tan, Libby and 
Hunton 2002 for accuracy, Mercer 2005 for completeness and Libby and Tan 1999 for 
timeliness).  Accuracy, completeness, and timeliness capture a single construct of 
forthcomingness. Research in psychology finds that being more forthcoming about disclosures 
leads to higher perceived credibility (Giffin 1967; Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995). 
Mercer’s credibility framework also shows that, at least in a short term, more forthcoming are 
attributed to a higher rank of positive dispositional characteristics (Link A of Figure 2) (i.e., 
honesty), which in turn will lead to a higher credibility judgment of managers (Link B of Figure 
2) and consequently their subsequent disclosures (Link C of Figure 2).  Mercer (2005) 
manipulates forthcomingness by varying whether managers have provided warnings about 
unexpected earnings.  
  Management credibility is the function of management competence and management 
trustworthiness.  In her study, Mercer (2005) asked her participants six questions by combining 
questions from two widely accepted source credibility scales – the McCroskey (1966) Source 
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Credibility Scale and the Leathers (1992) Personal credibility Scale. The three competence 
questions focused on investors’ perceptions of the competence, knowledge, and qualifications of 
management for providing financial disclosures. The three trustworthiness questions focused on 
investors’ perceptions of managements’ trustworthiness, honesty, and truthfulness. Mercer (2005) 
conducted a reliability analysis and finds that all six questions capture one underlying construct: 
management credibility.    
2.3.2 Management Credibility Framework: Predicted Model in Chapter 3 Study 
  The credibility model in Mercer (2004) suggests that management credibility and 
disclosure credibility seem to matter more when management is perceived to have greater 
incentives to mislead.  When management issues a good news forecast after poor reported 
earnings for the past period, they are likely to be perceived to have greater incentives to be 
overly optimistic. Therefore, a good news forecast following poor reported earnings is inherently 
less believable and hence, a credibility enhancing mechanism can provide incremental credibility 
benefit.   
  Accordingly, I choose to examine management credibility and disclosure credibility in 
this context.  That is, I investigate how managers can apply a credibility-enhancing mechanism 
to improve the disclosure credibility of a good news forecast following a poor reported earnings. 
Specifically, I establish a theoretical model and provide experimental evidence that managers 
can enhance the perceived credibility of a good news forecast (i.e., inherently less credible) by 
supplementing it with downside information (i.e., inherently more credible) when managers are 
perceived to have greater incentives to disclose good news forecasts.   As I have discussed in 
early sections, the use of downside information is an application of the two-sided research in the 
marketing literature, which suggests that management credibility can be enhanced if they are 
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perceived to be more forthcoming.   In addition, I predict that investors’ perception of whether 
the manager can control the event described in the downside information can impact investors’ 
forthcomingness judgment of management. Thus, my study in Chapter 3 proposes a model (see 
Figure 3) whereby investors’ perceived controllability will affect how they perceive management 
forthcomingness (Link A of Figure 3), and the perceived management forthcomingness will 
impact investors’ judgment of management credibility (Link B of Figure 3), which consequently 
affects their credibility judgment of the good news forecast in the same disclosure (Link C of 
Figure 3).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
DOWNSIDE INFORMATION AND  
INVESTORS’ FORECAST CREDIBILITY JUDGMENTS  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
   Chapter 2 reviews two-sided research in marketing literature and management credibility 
research in financial accounting literature. I also explain why two-sided literature in marketing 
can serve as a springboard to management disclosure literature in accounting research and 
articulate how the credibility frameworks in existing financial accounting research map into the 
theoretical model I use as the basis for the predictions in Chapter 3.  Chapter 3 builds upon this 
by offering a theoretical framework and experimental evidence regarding how management can 
enhance the credibility of their good news forecasts by supplementing the forecast with 
downside information.  
   Managers’ ability to communicate expectations of their firms’ future prospects to market 
participants is essential to reduce information asymmetry (Diamond 1985; King, Pownall, and 
Waymire 1990; Coller and Yohn 1997; Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 2001), and 
consequently, to enhance stock liquidity (Lang and Lundholm 1996) and reduce the cost of 
capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Healy, Hutton and Palepu 1999).  However, prior 
research suggests good news management forecasts can lack credibility (Hutton, Miller and 
Skinner 2003; Hutton and Stocken 2009; Ng, Tuna and Verdi 2008).  The challenge to credibly 
release good news forecasts is particularly acute when the reported earnings for the prior year are 
not favorable because managers often are perceived to have greater incentives to provide good 
news earnings forecasts in these cases (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Beniluz 2007).  Therefore, 
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even if maximizing credibility is not their key objective, managers stand to benefit from 
understanding what factors enhance the credibility of their disclosures.   
  Firms often supplement good news forecasts with other information in an effort to 
enhance forecast credibility (Waymire 1984; Hoskin, Hughes and Ricks 1986; Han and Wild 
1991; Baginski, Hassell and Hillison 2000; Miller 2002).  However, not all supplementary 
information enhances the credibility of management forecasts (Hutton et al. 2003).  Recent 
research provides evidence that only verifiable supplementary information (i.e., more 
quantifiable information) about earnings components can increase the credibility of good news 
management forecasts (Hutton et al. 2003; Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman 2007).  Yet 
managers also desire to disclose less verifiable information, likely because it is less costly to 
produce; however, prior research concludes that such disclosures may not increase the credibility 
of good news forecasts (Hutton et al. 2003).   
This chapter examines a mechanism, supplementing a good news forecast with less-
verifiable downside information, for managers to more credibly communicate good news 
forecasts. Managers can supplement a good news forecast with downside information that 
explains why the forecast may decrease (hereafter, downside information), or with upside 
information that explains why the forecast may increase (hereafter, upside information).  I 
investigate how the presence of downside supplementary information affects investors’ 
perceived credibility of good news forecasts following poor earnings news for the prior year.  I 
also examine whether the level of the credibility enhancement depends on the extent to which 
investors perceive that management can control the event discussed in the supplementary 
information.  
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I hypothesize that the credibility of a good news forecast will be enhanced when 
managers supplement the good news forecast with downside information.  My prediction is 
based on attribution theory in psychology, which suggests that investors are more (less) likely to 
attribute the motivation for disclosing incentive-inconsistent (incentive-consistent) downside 
(upside) information to managers’ forthcomingness (Jones and Davis 1965). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, prior accounting research indicates that investors view the managers to be more 
credible when they perceive managers to be more forthcoming; as such, they perceive managers’ 
disclosures to be more credible (Mercer 2005). After poor earnings are reported for the prior 
period, I expect that investors perceive managers to be more forthcoming and in turn, to be more 
credible when they supplement a good news forecast with downside information.  As a result, I 
predict that disclosing downside supplementary information will enhance investors’ perception 
of management credibility, and consequently the credibility of the good news forecast (i.e., the 
credibility of a specific disclosure).   
Moreover, I predict that the credibility-enhancing effect from this mechanism depends, in 
part, on the extent to which investors perceive that managers can control the factors discussed in 
the downside supplementary information.  Guided by research on attribution theory (Weiner 
1980, 1985, 2000), I argue that downside information is more likely to lead investors to consider 
managers’ motivations for reporting this information as compared to upside information.  When 
the downside information discusses factors that are more controllable by management (e.g., 
higher materials costs), investors may perceive managers to have a greater incentive to report 
such downside information, due to the potential litigation risks and reputational costs of 
subsequent negative outcomes when ex-post reasons are revealed.  Thus, managers are less likely 
 26 
to be recognized as forthcoming in reporting downside information that discusses more-
controllable factors.   
On the other hand, investors may perceive managers to be more forthcoming for 
discussing less-controllable factors (e.g., macroeconomic factors) in their downside information, 
because managers are expected to have less incentive to report such information. Therefore, as 
discussed in the expected model in Chapter 2, I expect that supplementing a good news forecast 
with downside information will have a greater impact on investors’ judgments of management 
forthcomingness, management credibility and consequently forecast credibility when the 
downside information discusses factors less controllable by management as compared to more-
controllable by management (see Figure 3).  
I test my predictions using a 2x2 between-subjects experiment with a control condition.  
Graduate business students assume the role of reasonably informed investors.  All participants 
observe a hypothetical company’s earnings press release, which includes (1) reported earnings 
for the prior year that convey bad news (i.e., earnings for year 2009 lower than that for year 
2008), (2) a good news earnings forecast (i.e., an earnings forecast for year 2010 higher than 
reported earnings for year 2009), and (3) supplementary information to the forecast.
4
  Next, 
participants evaluate the credibility of this good news forecast.  They then respond to a series of 
questions designed to measure their assessments regarding management and management’s 
disclosures (e.g., forecast). I manipulate the valence of supplementary information to be either 
upside or downside information. I also manipulate the controllability of supplementary 
information by varying whether the factors discussed in the supplementary information are likely 
to be perceived as more-controllable or less controllable by management.  The primary 
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Except for the control condition in which no supplementary information accompanies the good news earnings 
forecast, all participants in other conditions receive supplementary information that is less verifiable.   
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dependent variable in the experiment is investors’ credibility judgments of the good news 
forecast.  
As predicted, participants perceive a good news management forecast to be more credible 
when this forecast is supplemented with downside information than with upside information.  My 
results also support the prediction that the controllability and valence have interactive effects on 
participants’ credibility judgments.  Specifically, participants reward (do not reward) managers 
for being forthcoming by reporting higher (lower) forecast credibility judgments when the 
downside information describes factors that are perceived to be less controllable (more-
controllable) by management. The findings indicate that the main effect of credibility 
enhancement is driven by the disclosure of downside information that discusses factors perceived 
to be less controllable by management.  The findings still hold when the participants’ judgments 
in the downside information conditions are compared to those in the control condition when no 
supplementary information is disclosed.  Finally, additional analysis provides evidence that is 
consistent with the theory grounding my predictions. Specifically, the path analyses suggest that 
the enhanced forecast credibility associated with the disclosure of downside information reflects 
participants’ perceptions of management.  In particular, it is participants’ judgments of 
management’s forthcomingness that mediates the influence of supplementary information 
controllability on their forecast credibility judgments.   
My findings contribute both to academic research and to practice. I contribute to the 
accounting literature that examines mechanisms for enhancing the credibility of positive news 
that is otherwise most likely to suffer credibility concerns.  First, I focus on a feature that has not 
been studied in prior research on management earnings forecasts—using downside information 
to supplement good news forecasts. Winchel (2007) also provides evidence of credibility-
 28 
enhancement in analysts’ favorable recommendations if analysts provide downside information 
as well in the recommendation. 
5
  Second, I provide evidence that less-verifiable supplementary 
information can enhance forecast credibility.  Prior accounting research finds that verifiable 
information can enhance the credibility of positive news (see Hutton et al. 2003; Hirst et al., 
2007; Kadous, Koonce and Towry 2005).  Prior archival research also suggests that less-
verifiable explanations of earnings forecasts do not enhance market reactions to good news 
disclosures (Hutton et al. 2003).  My study extends the findings of Hutton et al. (2003) by 
showing that managers can enhance their good news forecast credibility with less-verifiable 
downside supplementary information if this information discusses factors that are less 
controllable by management.   
Third, I extend prior archival research (i.e., Baginski et al. 2000) by showing that bad 
news supplementary information that refers to external events can enhance the credibility of 
good news forecast. Baginski et al. (2000) finds that managers often supplement good news 
forecasts with an explanation of positive earnings causes related to internal factors, and bad news 
forecasts with an explanation of negative earnings causes related to external factors.  They also 
find that the market reacts stronger to unexpected earnings when explained causes are present 
(relative to absent).  My study extends Baginski et al. (2000) by showing that down-side 
supplementary information about external factors enhances the credibility of a good news 
forecast.
6
 
                                                 
5
 In an analyst setting, Winchel (2007) also examines the credibility-enhancing effect of downside information.  She 
finds that the presence of downside argumentations increases the credibility of a favorable analyst recommendation 
but only when participants view a favorable recommendation with only upside argumentations together with a 
favorable recommendation including both upside and downside argumentations.  
6
 Baginski, Hassell and Hillison (2000) examine conditions under which management voluntarily disclose causes of 
earnings (i.e., termed as causal attributions in Baginski et al.) in addition to their earnings forecasts and the extent to 
which security prices responses are associated with the explained causes. The two studies also differ in the following 
aspects. First, Baginski et al. (2000) use an archival methodology and infer the credibility of management earnings 
forecasts from aggregate market reaction to the existence of a type of supplementary information; while my study  
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Fourth, my study also contributes to the information bundling literature. Several recent 
papers provide empirical evidence that firms increasingly disclose negative earnings news 
bundled with other positive information, such as information of patents (Landsford 2006), 
forward-looking information (Beniluz 2007; Rogers and Buskirk 2008), and restatements (Myers, 
Scholz and Sharp 2009).  The findings suggest that managers strategically disclose the positive 
news to mitigate the negative impact of the disappointing earnings news.   My study extends 
their findings by documenting that bundling downside information with a good news forecast 
can enhance the credibility of the forecast.  Moreover, I address an issue that should be of 
interest to corporate managers, who have attempted to credibly communicate their forward-
looking information to attract investors with a long-term focus.  The academic literature confirms 
that more credible managers are better able to communicate information to the capital market 
(Williams 1996; Mercer 2004; Hirst et al. 2007). My findings suggest that corporate managers 
could provide downside supplementary information to accompany good news forward-looking 
information in order to increase the perceived credibility of their good news disclosures.  
However, there could be other costs for disclosing downside information; hence, implementing 
this mechanism should be considered as only one of the many possible inputs in the decision 
process.   
The remainder of Chapter 3 is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses relevant 
background research. Section 3.3 presents hypotheses development. Section 3.4 describes the 
                                                                                                                                                             
uses an experiment to directly test how a reasonably informed investor judges the credibility of a management 
forecast in the presence of supplementary information. Second, the two studies look at different types of 
supplementary information to management forecasts. Baginski et al. (2000) look at the causes of forecasted earnings 
that management  has provided along with the forecast news (i.e., an outcome of the cause); while my study looks at 
the potential factor s that may affect a given forecast (i.e., not an outcome and cause relationship). Third, the valence 
of the forecast of interest in these two studies differs. Baginski et al. show that when the forecast is good news, the 
earnings causes provided are more likely to be internally good news; when the forecast is bad news, the earnings 
causes provided are more likely to be externally bad news. My study focuses on how downside (internal versus 
external) supplementary information affects the credibility of a good news forecast.  Findings across the two studies 
are not inconsistent with each other. 
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experimental procedures. Section 3.5 discusses the results and supplementary analyses. Section 
3.6 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
3.2 Management Earnings Forecast Credibility 
 
Management earnings forecasts are one of the important types of voluntary disclosure 
mechanisms that provide information about the expected performance of a firm. Both academic 
and institutional evidence suggests the prominence of issuing management earnings forecasts. 
For example, Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki (2006) document that 31% of firms captured by the First 
Call database disclosed management forecasts in 2001.  A recent survey, which is released in 
May 2009 by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), reports that 60% of respondent 
firms provided earnings guidance in 2008-2009.    
Prior research indicates that a management forecast can reduce information asymmetry 
between management and investors (e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997).
7
  The reduced information 
asymmetry is likely to increase future liquidity of the firms’ stocks, and consequently lead to a 
lower cost of capital and enhanced corporate investment and growth (e.g., Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991; Healy et al. 1999).  Therefore, managers have incentives to effectively 
communicate their expectations of firms’ future performance to the market.   
However, extensive evidence indicates that investors do not take management earnings 
forecasts at face value (e.g., Hutton et al. 2003; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Ng et al. 2008).  
Institutional evidence suggests that nearly 40% of investors consider firms’ earnings guidance 
not credible (The Conference Board 2003).  Prior research also indicates that market participants 
often question managers’ incentives for issuing earnings forecasts (Hutton et al. 2003; Rogers 
and Stocken 2005).  For example, Rogers and Stocken (2005) report that investors think 
                                                 
7
 Coller and Yohn (1997) document a reduction in bid-ask spreads, a proxy for information asymmetry, as a 
consequence of providing management earnings forecasts. 
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managers are issuing self-serving forecasts when managers’ incentives are tied to firms’ stock 
price. Hutton et al. (2003) also find that investors are skeptical of management forecasts that are 
consistent with managers’ potential self-serving biases.  Existing literature has well documented 
the consequences of diminished credibility for management disclosures (Coller and Yohn 1997; 
Healy et al. 1999; Verrecchia 2001; Francis, Lefond, Olsson and Schipper 2004; Ng et al. 2008).   
Overall, the academic literature suggests that managers have a real challenge to issue 
credible good news forecasts, and this challenge is even greater upon reporting poor earnings for 
the prior year (Beniluz 2007).  Thus, it is not surprising that managers strive to increase their 
forecast credibility.  Recent research suggests that managers supplement good news forecasts 
with other information in order to enhance the forecast’s credibility.  Hutton et al. (2003) find 
that firms supplement their forecasts with other information about two-thirds of the time. They 
classify the supplementary information as verifiable information and less-verifiable soft-talk 
disclosures. They also show that managers disclose less-verifiable supplementary information 
with about the same frequency as verifiable supplementary information, with each type being 
used about 42% of the time.  Hutton et al. (2003) find that good news management earnings 
forecasts are more likely to result in stock price movements when the forecasts are accompanied 
by verifiable information about earnings components. Hirst et al. (2007) also provide 
experimental evidence that forecast credibility is enhanced when earnings components are 
forecasted in addition to a good news earnings forecast. In summary, verifiable supplementary 
information can enhance the credibility of good news management forecasts.   
Although managers also supplement their forecasts with less-verifiable information 
(Hutton et al., 2003), prior accounting research offers mixed evidence for the effect of such 
supplementary information.  On the one hand, Hutton et al. (2003) find that less-verifiable 
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information does not affect stock price. On the other hand, Hoskin, Hughes and Ricks (1986) and 
Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2002) suggest that the market reacts to less-verifiable forward-
looking information. Though prior research has not consistently documented the benefits of 
supplementing management forecasts with less verifiable information, managers still disclose 
less verifiable information; perhaps because it is less costly to generate such information than 
verifiable information.   My study proposes a mechanism that management can use to enhance 
forecast credibility using less-verifiable supplementary information; 
8
 as such, I provide insights 
to managers who desire credible communication with investors in order to obtain the benefit of 
lower information asymmetry, increased stock liquidity and reduced cost of capital.   
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
3.3.1 Attribution Theory and Information Credibility 
Attribution theory explains how a person infers the cause of another individual’s behavior 
(Fiske and Taylor 1991).  When a situational incentive is apparent, the cause of the individual’s 
behavior will more likely be attributed to the incentive (e.g., speaking positively about self). 
Otherwise, the cause of the behavior will more likely be attributed to the individual’s 
dispositional characteristics (e.g., being forthcoming).   Moreover, in the case of information 
disclosure, an information provider’s credibility influences the perceived credibility of the 
information (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979).  As such, if an information provider is perceived to 
have stronger incentives to provide positive information, information recipients are more likely 
to attribute positive information to the provider’s incentives and judge it as less credible when 
receiving only positive information (Crowley and Hoyer 1994).  Conversely, information 
                                                 
8
 Hence, the supplementary information provided in my experiment is less verifiable in nature across all conditions.  
For simplicity, I use supplementary information to refer to less verifiable supplementary information throughout the 
paper, unless specified. 
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recipients view the positive information as more credible when receiving negative information 
along with the positive information in a message, because disclosing negative information 
conflicts with the information provider’s incentives.  
As noted in Chapter 2, prior marketing and advertising research, primarily guided by 
attribution theory in psychology (Jones and Davis 1965), shows a consistent effect of enhancing 
perceived credibility of the advertisers and the positive information (Settle and Golden 1974; 
Swinyard 1981; Etgar and Goodwin 1982; Kamins and Marks 1987) by including both positive 
and negative information about a product in the advertisement.  For example, advertisers are 
perceived to be more forthcoming when they voluntarily admit negative information in an 
advertisement than those who do not (Golden and Alpert 1987; Crowley and Hoyer 1994; 
Friestad and Wright 1994). As a result, the credibility of the positive information increases in the 
presence of the negative information in an advertisement.  
3.3.2 Valence of Supplementary Information and Forecast Credibility 
Likewise, attribution theory suggests that the valence of the supplementary information to 
the management forecasts can affect the perceived credibility of the forecasts via its impact on 
investors’ perception of management characteristics (Jones and Davis 1965; Fiske and Taylor 
1991).   I propose that supplementing a good news forecast with downside information, as 
opposed to upside information, enhances the perceived credibility of this forecast.   
Given investors’ perceptions of managers’ self-serving incentives when poor earnings 
were reported in the prior year, they likely expect managers to provide strictly positive news in 
order to overcome the negative impact from the poor earnings news. That is, attribution theory 
suggests that investors are more likely to attribute disclosing good news forecasts to 
management’s incentives (Jones and Davis 1965).  Drawing upon this theory, accounting 
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research finds that investors perceive incentive-consistent information as less credible than 
incentive-inconsistent information (e.g., Hirst, Koonce and Simko 1995).  As such, investors are 
more likely to judge the good news forecasts as less credible (Jones and Davis 1965).  
Supplementing the good news forecast with upside information might only amplify the lack of 
forecast credibility because such action of supplementing information also may be attributed to 
managers’ incentives.  
Conversely, I argue that managers can enhance the credibility of their good news 
forecasts by supplementing these forecasts with downside information. Because managers tend to 
have fewer personal incentives to disclose negative news than positive news (Dimma 1996; 
Hughes 1997),
9
 attribution theory predicts that investors are more likely to attribute the 
disclosure of downside information to management’s dispositional characteristics (i.e., 
forthcomingness) than the disclosures of upside information that is consistent with the managers’ 
incentives (Jones and Davis 1965).   That is, when managers provide the downside 
supplementary information, investors are more likely to perceive management as being 
forthcoming.  Research in psychology (Giffin 1967; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995) and 
accounting (Mercer 2005) suggest that a more forthcoming manager is perceived to be more 
credible.  Moreover, source credibility literature in psychology (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) and 
management forecast credibility literature (e.g., Mercer 2004; Hirst, Koonce and Mercer 2007) in 
accounting suggest that the credibility of management forecasts (i.e., the credibility of a specific 
disclosure) is in part affected by the overall level of management credibility.  As a result, I 
predict that the presence of downside supplementary information acts as a credibility enhancer 
for management’s good news forecasts.  
                                                 
9
 Research in financial reporting suggests that bad news disclosures are inherently more credible than good news 
disclosures (Hassell and Jennings 1988; Skinner 1994; Williams 1996; Cairney and Richardson 1999; Hutton et al. 
2003) because disclosing bad news acts against management’s typical incentives.   
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 The above argument leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1:  Investors will judge a good news management forecast to be more credible when the               
forecast is supplemented with downside information than with upside information.   
 
3.3.3 Controllability of Supplementary Information and Forecast Credibility 
Prior research indicates that managers supplement their earnings forecasts with different 
types of information (Hutton et al. 2003). For example, the factors discussed in the 
supplementary information can be internal factors that are more controllable by management, 
such as the discussion of the change in material costs; or external factors that are less 
controllable by management, such as the discussion of the macroeconomic environment 
(Baginski et al. 2000).  I predict that the controllability of the supplementary information (e.g. 
whether the factors described in the supplementary information are perceived to be more or less 
controllable by management) will interact with the valence of the supplementary information to 
influence the perceived credibility of management forecasts.   
  As noted in Chapter 2, I rely on Mercer’s credibility framework to discuss how the 
controllability of the supplementary information affects management credibility and in turn their 
disclosure credibility. Attribution theory in psychology suggests that if the factor is perceived to 
be internally controllable by the information provider, a negative factor will be more likely to 
lead information recipients to generate negative attributional thinking (Weiner 1980, 1985, 2000).  
In the case of management earnings forecasts, investors are likely to question whether managers 
are forthcoming. 
  When managers supplement their good news forecasts with downside information that 
discusses more-controllable factors, investors will more likely question managers’ incentives for 
disclosing the downside information.  Managers are expected to have stronger ex ante incentives 
to report the downside information for fear of potential litigation risks and reputational risks, if a 
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negative outcome is later found to be caused by a factor that is perceived to be more controllable 
by management.  That is, the potential risks will be more likely to motivate managers to disclose 
beforehand the downside information about those more-controllable factors.  In this case, 
investors are less likely to recognize the managers as forthcoming about negative news since 
disclosing this type of downside information is compatible with managers’ incentives.  As a 
result, supplementing a good news forecast with downside information is less likely to enhance 
the forecast’s credibility when the downside information discusses factors that are perceived to 
be more controllable by management (See Figure 3). 
In contrast, managers are less likely to be held accountable for not disclosing downside 
information, over which they have less control.  Thus, managers are expected to have less 
incentive to disclose such downside information.  Accordingly, if managers disclose downside 
information and discuss factors that are less controllable by management, managers will benefit 
from being viewed as forthcoming via disclosing the downside information because the 
incentive-compatibility of making such disclosure is less apparent (Link A in Figure 3) (Weiner 
1980, 1985, 2000).   Consequently, investors’ perception of management credibility 10 (Link B in 
Figure 3) and in turn, their forecast credibility will be enhanced (Link C in Figure 3) when 
managers supplement their good news forecast with downside information that discusses less-
controllable factors. 
In summary, my second hypothesis is as follows:  
H2:  The disclosure of downside supplementary information will more likely enhance 
investors’ credibility judgments for a good news management forecast when the 
                                                 
10
 As discussed in Chapter 2, management credibility is the function of management trustworthiness and 
management competence (Mercer 2004, 2005).   To determine whether my participants perceived component of 
management credibility as different constructs from management credibility and from each other, I asked 
participants to assess their judgments of management trustworthiness and management competence (see Footnote 15 
for additional analysis).  
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downside information is perceived to be less controllable versus more controllable by 
management.  
 
3.4 Research Method 
3.4.1 Participants 
To test my hypotheses, I designed and conducted a computerized experiment.  Ninety-
seven Masters of Finance and MBA students from a large public university in the Midwest 
participated in the experiment. Of all the participants, 74% are MBA students and 26% are MSF 
students. All participants possessed a reasonable understanding of business, accounting, and 
finance; as each had taken 3.21 accounting courses and 3.88 finance courses on average and 94 
percent of participants had used financial statements to evaluate a company’s performance at 
least one time.  In addition, 62 percent of participants stated that they had purchased common 
stock or debt securities, while 90 percent said that they planned to do so in the next five years.   
Prior research suggests that graduate business students represent a good proxy for 
reasonably informed investors for tasks with low integrative complexity (Elliott, Hodge, 
Kennedy and Pronk 2007).  Prior to conducting my experiment, I determined that the task in my 
study was similar to those described by Elliott et al. (2007) as low in integrative complexity.  I 
also determined that a reasonable understanding of financial accounting concepts and basic 
finance would be necessary and sufficient for participants to respond meaningfully to my 
experimental materials.  My participants meet these criteria.  I randomly assigned participants to 
experimental conditions and participants completed the experiment in a computer lab.  
Participants were given $20 compensation for their participation in the study. 
3.4.2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
I test my predictions using a 2x2 between-subjects experiment with a control condition.  
Participants assumed the role of reasonably informed investors.  Using Media Lab software, 
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participants were given background information and historical accounting information about a 
hypothetical office products company.  Then, they viewed a company announcement made at the 
end of the fiscal year.  The announcement contains: the company’s poor reported earnings for the 
prior year (i.e., the earnings for 2009 was lower than the reported earnings for year 2008), and a 
good news management earnings forecast for the coming year,
11
 which is accompanied by the 
supplementary information.  The appendix reproduces the details of the experimental 
manipulations (see Appendices).
 
 
The first independent variable is the valence of supplementary information, varying at 
two levels.  In the upside information condition, the good news forecast is accompanied by 
supplementary information that explains why the forecast may be increased (e.g., further cost 
reduction would increase the above estimate of earnings).  In the downside information condition, 
the good news forecast is accompanied by supplementary information that explains why the 
good news forecast may be decreased (e.g., further cost increase would reduce the above 
estimate of earnings).   
The second independent variable is the controllability of supplementary information, also 
varying at two levels. In the less-controllable condition, the supplementary information discusses 
factors meant to be perceived less controllable by management (e.g., the forecast assumes that 
the macroeconomic environment will at least approximate the current environment. Further 
deteoriation would reduce the above estimate of earnings). In the more-controllable condition, 
                                                 
11
 I purposely choose annual earnings forecast because the estimate period (timeframe the estimates cover) most 
commonly used for forecast is annual (NIRI 2009).  In addition, previous research indicates that annual management 
forecasts are perceived to be less credible than quarterly earnings forecasts (Hutton et al. 2003). Furthermore, I use a 
good news forecast in my study (as the earnings forecast is greater than the prior year’s reported earnings).  Good 
news forecasts are likely to suffer from a credibility concern because they are more likely to be consistent with 
managers’ incentives (Rogers and Stocken 2005). This deficit in credibility associated with good news forecasts is 
an important part of my research design, as it provides me the best opportunity to determine whether the disclosure 
of downside supplementary information can enhance forecast credibility. The disclosure of downside supplementary 
information is much less likely to exert an effect on investors’ credibility judgments of bad news forecasts, which 
are inherently more credible than good news forecasts (Jennings 1987). 
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the supplementary information discusses factors meant to be perceived more controllable by 
management (e.g., the forecast assumes that the cost of raw materials will at least approximate 
the current costs.  Further cost increase would reduce the above estimate of earnings).   
The main dependent measure is designed to capture participants’ judgments of forecast 
credibility. Upon completing their review of the announcement, I asked participants to provide 
one credibility-related judgment.
12
  Participants used an 11-point Likert-type scale to indicate the 
believability of the good news earnings forecast provided by the hypothetical company’s 
management.  Participants also answered manipulation check questions and other questions 
about management characteristics.  
3.5 Results 
 
3.5.1 Manipulation Checks 
 
Responses to the manipulation check questions indicated that most manipulations were 
successful. For the valence of supplementary information manipulation, 90% (93%) of the 
participants in the upside (downside) information condition correctly indicated the valence of the 
supplementary information.  For the supplementary information controllability manipulation, in 
the more-controllable condition, 92% of participants correctly recalled that they received 
supplementary information that discussed a more-controllable factor (i.e., material costs), 
whereas in the less-controllable condition, 100% of participants correctly recalled that they 
received supplementary information that discussed a less-controllable factor (i.e., 
macroeconomic environment). 
13
 
                                                 
12
 While responding to the questions, participants had access to the links directing them to the case information. 
Participants were not allowed to change responses to a question once they submitted their responses.  
13
 To determine whether participants perceived differences in the more-controllable and less-controllable 
supplementary information, I asked participants to evaluate the extent to which managers can take action to control 
for the event described in the supplementary information.  Using an 11-point Likert-type scale anchored on 0 = Not 
at all controllable by the management and 10= Very much controllable by the management, participants gave mean 
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3.5.2 The Effects of the Valence of Supplementary Information 
My first hypothesis predicts that supplementing a good news management forecast with 
downside information enhances the credibility of this good news forecast, as compared to upside 
information or no supplementary information.  In this section, I test my hypothesis by comparing 
the participants’ credibility judgments of the good news forecast when they observe the 
downside information versus the upside information.  However, I also test the hypothesis by 
comparing the credibility judgments in downside information condition with a control condition 
(when no supplementary information is provided) in Section 3.5.4.2.  
Results of my experiment support the first hypothesis.  Panel A of Table 1 provides the 
means and standard deviations for participants’ believability judgments of the good news 
forecast.  Using an 11-point Likert-type scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very 
believable, the judgments of participants who received the downside information (mean = 5.08) 
were higher than those who received the upside information (mean = 4.21).  An overall ANOVA 
(see panel B of Table 1 and Panel A of Figure 4) reveals a significant effect of the valence of 
supplementary information manipulation (F=2.38, p =.06, one-tailed).  Thus, investors’ 
credibility judgments of the good news forecast are higher in the presence of downside 
information than upside information, and my hypothesis is supported.   
3.5.3 The Effect of the Controllability of Supplementary Information 
My second hypothesis predicts that the credibility-enhancing effect of the downside 
supplementary information is moderated by investors’ perception of management’s 
controllability of this downside information. Specifically, I expect that downside supplementary 
                                                                                                                                                             
judgments of management controllability of 4.67 and 4.38 for the more-controllable condition and less-controllable 
condition, respectively.  The result is not significant (F = 0.30, p = 0.29, one-tailed).  I include the failed 
manipulation check as a limitation at the end of Chapter 3 and discuss how this might be addressed in a subsequent 
experiment in Chapter 5.   
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information will enhance the forecast credibility more (less) when the supplementary 
information discusses factors that are perceived less (more) controllable by management.  My 
hypothesis is supported if the credibility judgment differences in downside and upside 
information conditions are greater when the supplementary information discusses less-
controllable than when it discusses more-controllable factors.   However, I also test the 
hypothesis by comparing the credibility judgments in less and more controllable conditions with 
a control condition (when no supplementary information is provided) in Section 3.5.4.2.   
Results of my experiment support the second hypothesis.  Panel A of Table 1 provides 
the descriptive statistics for participants’ believability judgments of the good news forecast.  The 
mean credibility judgments for participants in the more-controllable condition (i.e., related to 
material costs) were 4.58 and 4.45 for the upside information condition and the downside 
information condition, respectively.  The mean credibility judgments for participants in the less-
controllable condition (i.e., related to macroeconomic environment) were 3.84 and 5.70 for the 
upside information condition and the downside information condition, respectively.  An overall 
ANOVA (see panel B of Table 1 and panel B of Figure 4) reveals a marginally significant 
interaction between valence and controllability (F=3.15, p =.08, two-tailed).   Panel C of Table 1 
shows that, for the less-controllable condition, investors’ credibility judgments of a good news 
forecast is significantly higher when receiving downside information versus upside information 
(F=5.91, p =.01, one-tailed); but no significant difference is observed between downside 
information and upside information for the more-controllable condition (F=0.02, p =.44, one-
tailed).    
In addition, Panel C of Table 1 reveals that investors’ credibility judgments of the good 
news forecast when accompanied by downside information that is less controllable (mean = 
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5.70) compared to when accompanied by downside information that is more controllable (mean 
= 4.58)  is marginally significantly higher (F=2.46, p =.06, one-tailed).  Thus, disclosing 
downside information shows a positive impact on investors’ credibility judgments when the 
information is related to a less-controllable factor (e.g., macroeconomic environment) but not 
when it is related to a more-controllable factors (e.g., material costs), supporting H2.  The results 
suggest that the credibility-enhancing effect from disclosing downside information is driven by 
one type of supplementary information, which discusses less-controllable factors that may 
decrease the good news forecast.  The results from comparing the downside condition and the 
upside condition with the control condition provide similar support for H2, which will be 
discussed in detail in the additional analyses section (see Section 3.5.4.2) 
3.5.4. Additional Analyses 
3.5.4.1. Evidence of Mediation by Management Forthcomingness  
Recall that in developing Hypothesis 2, I draw upon the attribution theory in psychology 
and build upon prior credibility framework in management disclosure to develop my predictions. 
I predict that the effect of supplementary information controllability on investors’ forecast 
credibility judgments occurs through their impact on investors’ judgments of management 
forthcomingness (see Figure 3).
14
  I therefore apply a path analysis to simultaneously estimate 
the predicted direct and indirect relationships among the variables.  In summary, my theoretical 
model, as introduced in Chapter 2, predicts that controllability affects forthcomingness judgment, 
                                                 
14
 There is a possibility that participants perceived forthcomingness and management credibility to be the same 
construct. To address this issue, I have run the following tests. First, a rotated factor analysis reveals that 
forthcomingness and management credibility loaded on different factors (i.e., management credibility’s coefficient 
is 0.81 for factor 1 and 0.15 for factor 2, while forthcomingness’ coefficient is 0.19 for factor 1 and 0.68 for factor 2). 
In addition, the explanatory power of forthcomingness (R2 = 0.11) on forecast credibility is lower than that of 
management credibility (R2 = 0.40).  Furthermore, 79% participants’ forthcomingness judgments are significantly 
different from their management credibility judgments.  All this evidence suggests that participants in my 
experiment perceived the measure of forthcoming and management credibility as capturing two different constructs.   
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which in turn influences judgment of management credibility.  Results for my theoretical model 
are presented in Panel C of Figure 4.   
Participants report higher management forthcomingness when they receive downside 
information that describes less-controllable factors than more-controllable factors (βA= -0.33, t = 
-2.30); in turn, participants who view management as more forthcoming also perceive 
management to be more credible (βB= 0.69, t = 8.38), which consequently leads to higher 
credibility judgments of the good news forecast (βC= 0.65, t = 6.95).   The goodness of fit test 
shows a fit in the model.  The null hypothesis that the model in Figure 4, Panel B ―fits the data,‖ 
is inferred because a chi-square test is not rejected (χ2 = 5.28, p = 0.15).  Additional goodness of 
fit indices, namely Bentler and Bonett’s normal fit index (NFI = 0.91) and non-normal fit index 
(NNFI = 0.91), as well as Bentler’s comparative fit index (CFI = 0.95), also indicate a fit of this 
model (i.e., with value > 0.90, Hatcher 2005).   
In summary, the findings suggest that the effect of supplementary information 
controllability on investors’ forecast credibility judgments occurs through their impact on 
investors’ judgments of management forthcomingness. 15  
3.5.4.2. Additional evidence: comparison with the control condition 
  I now revisit Hypothesis 1 and 2 by comparing the downside (upside) information 
conditions to a control condition, which includes no supplementary information.  To test H1, it is 
                                                 
15
 Recall that in order to determine whether participants perceived component of management credibility as separate 
constructs, I asked participants to assess their judgments of management trustworthiness and management 
competence.  I observe that participants’ perceptions of management credibility are strongly positively correlated 
with trustworthiness (r = 0.91, p <  0.01) and with competence (r = 0.66, p < 0.01).  A factor analysis of the 
individual items confirms the identification of one factor (i.e., eigenvalue of 3.45 with all other eigenvalues less than 
1) that explains 69% of the variance in the measures.  The observed model (i.e., controllabilityforthcomingness 
judgmentsmanagement credibility judgmentsforecast credibility judgments) remains to be a good fit when I 
measure management credibility using the participants’ rating of trustworthiness or competence. Therefore, the 
measure s of management trustworthiness, management competence and management credibility capture one 
credibility construct. Results are the same regardless whether I use a single measure or the mean ratings of multiple 
measures for management trustworthiness and management competence.  
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also meaningful to show that investors’ forecast credibility judgments are higher when downside 
supplementary information is provided than that in the control condition where no 
supplementary information is provided.  The mean credibility judgments are 5.08, 4.21 and 4.58 
for downside condition, upside condition and the control condition, respectively (see Panel A of 
Table 2).  The results are in the same direction with H1; however, the differences across 
conditions are not significant (F=1.25, p=0.15, one-tailed) (see Panel B of Table 2).   In addition, 
there is no significant difference between the control condition and the downside condition 
(F=0.54, p=0.23, one-tailed) or the upside condition (F=0.32, p=0.29, one-tailed) (see Panel C of 
Table 2); however, the insignificant differences do not invalidate my prediction.  Specifically, 
the analysis for my second hypothesis reveals that such insignificant findings occur because the 
observed credibility-enhancing effect is driven by one type of downside disclosure (i.e., when 
downside information discusses less controllable factors), while the current analysis combines 
the two types of downside disclosures (i.e., downside information discusses both less 
controllable and more controllable factors).   
Thus, it is also meaningful to show whether participants receiving downside 
supplementary information that discusses less-controllable (more-controllable) factors report 
higher (lower) forecast credibility judgments compared to those who are in the control condition, 
in which participants are provided with similar information as the other conditions except that 
there is no supplementary information provided.  Therefore, I compare results of the downside 
condition with those of the control condition (see Panel A of Table 3).  In the downside 
condition, the mean credibility judgments of 5.70 for the less-controllable condition is 
marginally significantly higher than that of 4.58 for the control condition (F=2.30, p=0.07, one-
tailed), whereas the mean credibility judgments of 4.45 for the more-controllable condition is not 
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significantly different from that of 4.58 for the control condition (F=0.03, p=0.43, one-tailed) 
(see Panel B of Table 3).  Conversely, no comparisons are significant for the more-controllable 
condition. 
16
  
To further support the theoretical development for H2, I also compare investors’ 
forthcomingness judgments when they receive downside information (downside condition) to 
when they receive no supplementary information (control condition) (not tabulated).  In the 
downside condition, the mean forthcomingness judgments of 6.30 for the less-controllable 
condition is marginally significantly higher than that of 5.68 for the control condition (F=2.00, 
p=0.08, one-tailed), whereas the mean credibility judgments of 4.90 for the more-controllable 
condition is marginally significantly lower than that of 5.68 for the control condition (F=2.47, 
p=0.06, one-tailed).   The findings provide additional evidence that disclosing downside 
information that discusses less-controllable factors enhances investors’ judgments of 
management forthcomingness; whereas disclosing downside information that discusses more-
controllable factors decreases investors’ judgments of management forthcomingness.   
3.5.4.3. Evidence of attribution to management 
Given that investors’ perception of management forthcomingness mediates the effect of 
management controllability on investors’ forecast credibility judgments via its impact on 
management characteristics (i.e., management credibility), I expect the enhanced credibility 
judgments to persistently affect managers’ subsequent disclosures. As such, after completing the 
experiment, I provide all participants with an identical disclosure from management across all 
conditions and ask participants to assess the credibility of the subsequent disclosure.  The 
subsequent disclosure reflects positive news since positive news is less likely to be considered 
                                                 
16
 I also run planned comparisons to test the individual comparisons implicit in H1 and H2.  The results are 
consistent with those from the ANOVA tests, which provide additional support for my predictions.   
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credible, and contains no supplementary information. My findings indicate that the enhanced 
credibility persistently affects subsequent disclosures (see Table 4 and Table 5).   
Because my findings suggest that the credibility-enhancing effect is driven by the 
disclosure of downside information about the less-controllable macroeconomic environment, it is 
more meaningful to report results of the credibility persistence for the less-controllable 
condition. Using an 11-point Likert-type scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= 
Very believable, participants who initially receive a downside disclosure (mean = 6.80) judge the 
subsequent forecast update to be more believable than those who receive an upside disclosure 
(mean = 5.15) (F=6.76, p=0.01, one-tailed) (see Panel C, Table 4).   Participants in the downside 
condition (mean = 6.20) also indicate a greater reliance on the subsequent forecast update than 
those in the upside disclosure condition (mean = 4.58) (F=6.08, p=0.01, one-tailed) (see Panel C, 
Table 5).    Therefore, the findings suggest that the credibility enhanced from downside 
disclosures persistently impacts investors’ credibility judgments on management’s subsequent 
disclosures. 
17
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigates whether management’s disclosure of downside supplementary 
information to a good news forecast affects investors’ perceived credibility of the good news 
forecast following poor reported earnings for the prior year.   
The findings from my study suggest that participants receiving downside disclosures 
report higher forecast credibility judgments, compared to those receiving upside disclosures. I 
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 The finding is related to, but distinct from, Mercer (2005).  In that paper, Mercer examines and finds that the 
enhanced credibility from forthcoming management disclosure will persist to affect a subsequent earnings forecast.  
Prior to participants’ initial credibility judgment in the presence of the forthcoming disclosures, participants also 
receive information about earnings realizations. As a result, the credibility judgments from Mercer’s participants are 
likely to be influenced by the forthcomingness and the realization of earnings forecasts. My study is different from 
Mercer (2005) in that I explicitly examine whether the credibility enhanced will persist to affect investors’ judgment 
of a subsequent disclosure without the influence of another factor – realization of earnings.   
 47 
also find an interaction effect of the valence and controllability of supplementary information on 
investors’ credibility judgments of good news forecasts.  Specifically, participants rate the good 
news forecast in downside disclosures as more credible than that in upside disclosures, when the 
supplementary information discusses factors that are perceived to be less controllable by 
management.  In contrast, participants rate the good news forecast in downside disclosures not 
significantly different from that in upside disclosures, when the supplementary information 
discusses factors that are perceived more controllable by management.  
Additional evidence suggests that participants’ forthcomingness judgments mediate the 
effect of supplementary information controllability on their credibility judgments of good news 
forecasts.  Participants do not recognize managers for being forthcoming when the downside 
supplementary information discusses factors that are perceived more controllable by 
management; while participants recognize managers for being forthcoming when the downside 
information discusses factors that are perceived less controllable by management.   
  This study is subject to several limitations, which leaves room for future research. First, I 
limited the amount of information participants received in the experiment compared to the more 
complex information investors receive when they are evaluating a firm in a natural investment 
setting. However, reducing the complexity of the information environment allowed me to make 
stronger inferences about the specific factors that influenced participants’ credibility judgments. 
Second, I investigate whether certain type of downside disclosure can enhance the perceived 
credibility of a good news management forecast.   My findings cannot directly speak about 
whether the credibility enhancement can be applied to a bad news forecast.  However, Baginski, 
Hassell and Hillison (2000) provide archival evidence that the credibility of bad news forecasts is 
enhanced when managers provide causal explanations to the forecasts.  Accordingly, the findings 
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of my study should generalize to the bad news forecast.  However, an empirical test is needed to 
provide direct evidence.    
  Third, the failed manipulation check for perceived controllability may indicate that the 
actual construct that drives the effect is the ―internal/external‖ rather than the intended 
―more/less controllable‖ nature of the downside information.  Some participants may interpret 
the manipulation of material cost in my experiment as more controllable by the management 
while others may interpret it as less controllable by the management, given that the wording in 
the experiment did not explicitly spell out the controllability by managment.  However, the 
manipulation of material cost may be perceived as internal factors while the manipulation of 
macroenvironment may be perceived as external factors.  This speculation finds support in the 
archival paper Baginski et al. (2000), which label material costs as internal factors and 
macroenvironment as external factors.   I propose a study to tease these out in Chapter 5.  
  Fourth, I focus on less-verifiable supplementary information to construct the downside 
disclosure.  Future research could investigate whether the downside enhancing effect obtained in 
my study can be generalized to verifiable supplementary information. Prior accounting research 
indicates that verifiable supplementary information can enhance the credibility of management 
forecasts.  What remains an empirical question is whether the credibility-enhancement from the 
verifiable downside information can offset the negative impact of downside information that is 
verifiable and thus more likely to occur.  
  Finally, this study focuses on one benefit of disclosing downside information.  However, 
there are costs and benefits associated with disclosing downside information.  Implementing a 
downside disclosure mechanism should be considered as only one input of the decision making 
process for managers.    
 49 
  Despite these limitations, this study provides insights to managers about how to 
supplement information to their good news forecasts in order to enhance forecast credibility. 
Specifically, firms could enhance forecast credibility by disclosing downside supplementary 
information that discusses less-controllable factors.  The findings are important since managers 
desire to understand factors that individually and collectively enhance the credibility of their 
disclosures; which is true even when their key objective is not maximizing credibility.  This 
study also extends the findings in archival research by showing that less-verifiable forward-
looking information can increase the credibility of management forecasts, if the right type of 
information supplements the forecasts.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PROXIMITY AND THE CREDIBILITY ENHANCEMENT  
OF DOWNSIDE INFORMATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I further examine the boundary conditions for the credibility-enhancement 
from supplementing a good news forecast with downside information.  Companies often qualify 
their good news long-term information using disclosures that are distantly located from the long-
term information in the report;
18
 which is likely to reduce attention given to the qualifications.
19
  
Management could locate the downside information immediately after the forecast (hereafter, 
close proximity) or with intervening information separating the downside information from the 
forecasts (hereafter, distant proximity).  As such, I further test the effect of proximity on the 
credibility enhancing effect due to the downside information in my study.  
I predict that downside information in close (distant) proximity to the good news forecast 
will be more (less) likely to enhance the credibility of the forecast.  Recent financial accounting 
studies on disclosure formats indicate that investors’ judgments are influenced by the placement 
of information (e.g. Maines and McDaniel 2000).   When downside supplementary information 
is presented immediately following (i.e. in close proximity to) a good news forecast, both pieces 
are expected to be perceived as components of the same information (Wright 1991; Mathew 
1997).   Hence, the credibility enhancing effect of the downside information follows and leads 
investors to a higher judged credibility to the forecast.   Conversely, when some intervening 
information is presented in between a good news forecast and downside supplementary 
                                                 
18
 In order to benefit from the safe harbor protections offered by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, companies often identify factors that might cause the results in the forward-looking statement to possibly not 
come true.  However, companies often provide qualifiers in a general and vague manner; and most likely the 
qualifiers are placed at the end of the report.  
19
 This is consistent with conventional wisdom which seems to be to hide or downplay downside information.  
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information (i.e. in distant proximity), the forecast and the downside information are expected to 
be perceived as two separate pieces of news, and as a result, the credibility enhancing effect 
resulting from the downside information may not be realized (Bouwman 1982; Maines & 
McDaniel 2000).   
To test my hypothesis about proximity, within the experiment I described in Chapter 3, I 
also include a manipulation of the proximity of downside supplementary information to the good 
news forecast (close proximity versus distant proximity).  The results from this study provide 
some support for my prediction.  That is, participants receiving downside information in close 
proximity report a higher credibility judgment to the good news forecast compared to those 
participants receiving downside information in distant proximity, although the statistical 
difference is not significant at conventional levels.  However, participants receiving downside 
information in close proximity report a higher credibility judgment to the good news forecast 
compared to those participants receiving no supplementary information (a control condition), 
whereas participants receiving downside information in distant proximity report their credibility 
judgments insignificantly different from those in the control condition.    
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses relevant 
background research. Section 4.3 presents hypotheses development. Section 4.4 describes the 
experimental procedures. Section 4.5 discusses the results and supplementary analyses. Section 
4.6 summarizes and concludes the chapter.  
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
I expect that downside information in close proximity to a good news forecast leads 
investors to perceive the forecast to be more credible compared to downside supplementary 
information in distant proximity to the forecast.  
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Recent financial accounting studies on disclosure formats indicate that investors’ 
judgments are influenced by placement of information (e.g. Maines and McDaniel 2000).   Prior 
research has documented the blending effect of two piece of information. Hodge (2001) provides 
evidence that hyperlinking a firm's audited financial statements to unaudited information in a 
web-based environment leads investors to blend the unaudited information with the audited 
statements into a cohesive network of information (Wright 1991; Mathew 1997), making it more 
difficult for investors to identify correctly the origin of a given piece of information (Edwards 
and Hardman 1989; Foss 1989; McKnight et al. 1990).   On the other hand, in a hardcopy 
environment, the physical distinctiveness helps investors distinguish information presented in the 
audited financial statements from information presented in a separate unaudited letter to 
shareholders.  Similarly, when downside supplementary information is presented immediately 
following (i.e. in close proximity to) the good news forecasts, they are expected to be perceived 
as pieces of the same information. Hence, the credibility enhancing effect of downside 
information follows and leads to a higher sensitivity to the good news forecast. Conversely, 
when downside supplementary information is presented in distant proximity to the good news 
forecast (after some intervening information), they are expected to be perceived as two separate 
pieces of news, and as a result, the forthcomingness from downside information may not be 
realized.   
My prediction is based on findings of process tracing research, which shows that 
nonprofessional investors read financial information in the order presented (Bouwman 1982; 
Maines & McDaniel 2000).  Investors’ skepticism toward the early encountered good news 
forecasts are expected to carry over to influence their judgments (Ross, Lepper and Hubbard 
1975; Johnson and Seifert 1994).  Hence, subsequent disclosure of downside supplementary 
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information does not automatically lead to changes to the lack of credibility inferences.  That is, 
the benefit (i.e. credibility enhancer) obtained through the presence of downside information 
could be reduced when downside supplementary information is presented in distant proximity to 
a good news forecast.  As such, I expect that investors who receive downside supplementary 
information immediately following a good news forecast are more likely to recognize the 
credibility enhancement from the downside information to the forecast, relative to those who 
receive downside supplementary information after some intervening information to the good 
news forecast.   
This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H3:   Investors will judge a good news management forecast to be more credible when                         
receiving downside supplementary information in close proximity to the good 
news forecast than that in distant proximity to the forecast.   
 
4.3 Experimental Procedures 
 
In conjunction with the experiment described in Chapter 3, 
20
 I manipulate the proximity 
of the downside information, varying at two levels. In the close proximity condition, the 
downside information is located immediately after a good news forecast.  In the distant proximity 
condition, the downside information is located after some intervening information, which is after 
the good news forecast.  The appendix reproduces the supplementary information (see Appendix 
B).
 
 I also collect similar dependent measures as described in Chapter 3.   
4.4 Results 
 
My third hypothesis predicts that the two-sided credibility effect also depends on the 
proximity of the downside supplementary information to a good news forecast. I also test this 
hypothesis using participants’ believability judgments of the good news forecast.  Results of my 
                                                 
20
 Twenty more MBA and MSF students from the University of Illinois participated in the experiment to work in the 
distant proximity condition. 
 54 
study are in the same direction of my prediction; however, the effect is insignificant (see Table 
6).  Using an 11-point Likert-type scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very 
believable, the judgments of participants who received a close proximity two-sided disclosure 
(mean = 5.70) were higher than those who received a distant proximity two-sided disclosure 
(mean = 4.80).  However, an overall ANOVA (see panel B of Table 6) reveals an insignificant 
main effect of proximity on the credibility enhancement (F = 1.63, p =.105, one-tailed).   
I also compare the proximity condition with the control condition to test the impact of 
proximity on the credibility enhancement of downside information (not tabulated).  The results 
are consistent with H3.   The mean credibility judgments of 5.70 for the close-proximity 
condition is marginally significantly higher than that of 4.58 for the control condition (F=2.30, 
p=0.07, one-tailed), whereas the mean credibility judgments of 4.80 for the distant-proximity 
condition is not significantly different from that of 4.58 for the control condition (F=0.12, 
p=0.37, one-tailed).  Therefore, the disclosure of downside information in close proximity to the 
good news forecast shows a positive effect on investors’ credibility judgments, whereas the 
disclosure of downside information in distant proximity to the good news forecasts cannot 
benefit from the credibility-enhancing effect from the presence of downside information.   
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigates whether the proximity of downside supplementary information 
to a good news forecast affects the credibility enhancing effect due to the downside information. 
I find some evidence that disclosing downside information enhances forecast credibility 
judgments when the downside disclosures are in close proximity to the good news forecast, but 
not when they are in distant proximity to the good news forecast.  The results are insignificant 
when comparing credibility judgments of close proximity with those of distant proximity; 
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however, the credibility judgments are significantly higher from participants in close proximity 
than those in the control condition (when no supplementary information is provided).  Hence, my 
findings provide some evidence that the proximity of downside information to a good news 
forecast affects the level of credibility-enhancement of downside information.   
This study is subject to several limitations that can be addressed in future research. First, 
the experiment on the proximity effect is exploratory in nature, given that the theoretical 
development of my prediction for the proximity effect (i.e., H3) is limited.  Future research can 
enrich the theoretical development for the prediction.  Second, the insignificant findings may be 
due to the experimental design of the distant proximity versus the close proximity condition.  In 
my study, perhaps the downside information in distant proximity to the good news forecast was 
not distant enough to make the downside information distinct from the good news forecast.  
Hence, my participants in both close and distant proximity conditions still react to the downside 
information and the good news forecast similarly. This provides opportunities for future research 
(see chapter 5).   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I investigate whether management’s disclosure of downside supplementary information 
to a good news forecast affects investors’ perceived credibility of the good news forecast 
following poor reported earnings for the prior period.  I also test the boundary conditions for the 
credibility-enhancement.  
The findings from my study mostly support my predictions. Specifically, the perceived 
credibility of a good news forecast will be higher when the forecast is supplemented with 
downside information, as opposed to upside information. I also find that the credibility 
enhancement is determined by the controllability of the factors described in the supplementary 
information on investors’ credibility judgments of good news forecasts.  In addition, I find some 
evidence that the credibility enhancement is moderated by the proximity of the downside 
information to the good news forecast.  Additional evidence suggests that participants’ 
forthcomingness judgments mediate the effect of supplementary information controllability on 
their credibility judgments of good news forecasts.   
As discussed in the conclusion sections of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this study is subject 
to several limitations that can be addressed in future research.  Recall that in the experiment 
described in Chapter 3, some participants failed the manipulation check about the perceived 
controllability of downside information.   I conjecture that the actual construct manipulated that 
drives the effect is the ―internal/external‖ rather than the intended ―more/less controllable‖ nature 
of the downside information.  Future research can build on my study and examine how the 
perceived controllability affects the credibility enhancing effect of downside supplementary 
information, by providing a cleaner manipulation of the perceived controllability.  For example, 
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the more controllable downside information condition could be provided with the following 
manipulation: ―Further cost increase would decrease the above estimate of earnings. EJH’s 
management has full control over the cost.‖  On the other hand, the less controllable downside 
information condition could be provided with the following manipulation: ―Further cost 
reduction would decrease the above estimate of earnings. EJH’s management has no control 
over the cost.‖  The only difference between the two conditions is the manipulation of 
controllability, with everything else being held constant. In addition to these two conditions (i.e., 
full control cost condition versus no control cost condition), a third condition about the 
macroenvironment can be used to tease out whether the observed credibility enhancement in my 
study is driven by the construct of internal/external or more/less controllable.  
Also recall that the insignificant findings in the experiment in Chapter 4 may be due to 
the experimental design of the distant proximity versus the close proximity condition.  
Subsequent studies could design an experiment that can differentiate the relative distance 
between a good news forecast and its downside supplementary information for distant proximity 
versus close proximity.  A pretest could help determine the appropriate amount of intervening 
information between the downside supplementary information and a good news forecast.  In 
addition, manipulation check questions should be asked to ensure that participants have 
perceived and reacted to the differential distance between downside information and the good 
news forecasts across distant and close proximity conditions.  Future research could also 
examine also disentangle whether the proximity effect result from the spacial distance or the 
information content between the good news forecast and downside information.  Future 
experiments could also collect responses for investigating how investors integrate and/or 
separate information.   
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  Despite these limitations, this study provides insights to managers about how to 
supplement information to their good news forecasts in order to enhance forecast credibility. 
Specifically, firms could enhance forecast credibility by disclosing downside supplementary 
information that discusses less-controllable factors.  The findings are important since managers 
desire to understand factors that individually and collectively enhance the credibility of their 
disclosures; which is true even when their key objective is not maximizing credibility.  This 
study also extends the findings in archival research by showing that less-verifiable forward-
looking information can increase the credibility of management forecasts, if the right type of 
information supplements to the forecasts.   
  The findings in my study also provide insights to financial reporting literature.  First, 
downside disclosure can be useful for credibility enhancement in the context of good news 
management forecasts (i.e., my study) and analyst favorable recommendations (i.e., Winchel 
2007).  Future research can further explore whether such credibility enhancement can be 
obtained in other types of financial disclosures.   Second, given findings in the two-sided 
research in the marketing literature, future research in financial accounting can investigate 
whether the order and the amount of downside information affect the credibility enhancement 
resulting from the downside disclosure.  My study provides one piece of positive information 
(i.e., good news forecast) and one piece of negative information (i.e., downside supplementary 
information), with the good news forecast being more dominant. To design the two-sided 
manipulation, Winchel (2007) followed the threshold of 60% positive information and 40% 
negative information from marketing literature. That is, her participants were given three pieces 
of positive arguments and two pieces of negative arguments to support analysts’ favorable 
recommendation. Winchel’s (2007) participants did not react differently to the two-sided and 
 59 
one-sided manipulations, when they were given only two-sided or one-sided arguments.  Thus, 
several research questions remain to be addressed in terms of how information users react to 
varying structure of the two-sided disclosure and the differential sources of the two-sided 
disclosures.  
  The next step of my research is to address not only the issues as outlined in limitations of 
my study, but also explore the opportunities offered by the theoretical development and findings 
in marketing literature.           
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(All Conditions) 
 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS  
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  The purpose of the study is to investigate how 
investors make judgments and decisions. Your participation today will take approximately 20 
minutes. You will receive $20 for your participation.  
 
If you have any questions during the study, please do not hesitate to ask.  Please do not discuss 
this project with other students in the College of Business for approximately two weeks, because 
they may be asked to participate in this study at a later date. Discussing the study with others 
before the study is completed may invalidate the results of the study. 
 
Your input is very important to this study.  
 
You may now proceed with the case.  Thank you again for your participation. 
 
 
Ling Harris 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Accountancy 
University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign 
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(All Conditions) 
 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS  
 
For purpose of this study, you are asked to assume the role of a potential investor evaluating the 
common stock of EJH Inc., a hypothetical company. You will be provided with background and 
selected financial information about EJH, Inc.  You will be asked to provide judgments about 
EJH and its management based on your review of that information.  
 
The information you will read is not intended to include everything that you would normally use 
if you were to research an investment in depth.  Providing you with that level of detail would 
require more time to complete the case than could realistically be requested.  Please make the 
best judgments you can based on the information provided in these materials. 
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(All Conditions) 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Prior to your investment decision to purchase stock in EJH, Inc., you reviewed the company’s 
most recent annual report. Some background information and financial data from that annual 
report are shown on the following two pages. Please review this information before moving on to 
the next part of the case. 
 
 
Description of Company 
 
 
Business and Products 
 
EJH, Inc. is an Ohio-based company that engages in designing, developing, manufacturing, and 
marketing branded office products. It operates in three segments: A Group, B Group, and C 
Group. The A Group offers workspace tools, visual communication products, and storage and 
organization products to office products superstores, wholesalers, mail order catalogs, and 
independent dealers. The B Group provides document solutions, such as binding, lamination, and 
punching equipment and supplies. The B Group also provides machine maintenance and repair 
services and personal organization tools. The C Group provides accessories for Apple iPod 
products, security locks and power adapters for laptop computers, and other computer 
accessories for personal computers and mobile devices. The Company’s growth strategy 
emphasizes developing multiple generic product designs that can be customized to meet 
customer specifications. 
 
Marketing and Distribution 
 
The Company has established a direct sales force in the United States and Canada, and uses a 
combination of direct and indirect channels in Europe.  The company sells its products through 
independent manufacturer representatives, field salespeople, catalogs, and the Internet, as well as 
through office products stores in these markets.  
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(All Conditions) 
 
 
Summarized Financial Information 
 
The following is a summary of EJH, Inc.’s annual financial results in fiscal year 
2006, 2007 and 2008.  
 
 
Income Statement (all figures in millions except for EPS) 
Fiscal Year ending September 30 
 
 
 
  
2008 
 
2007 
 
2006 
    
Revenue $122.0 $139.0 $120.0 
Cost of Sales 61.6 68.1 61.2 
Gross Profit 60.4 70.9 58.8 
Other Expenses 47.9 55.6 47.4 
Net Income $12.5 $15.3 $11.4 
 
  
   2008 
 
    2007 
 
    2006 
EPS $1.61  $1.92 $1.42 
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(Upside/More-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
 
 
Instruction 
 
Recall that you are not invested in EJH’s stock. You are researching EJH as a 
potential investment. 
 
It is December 1, 2009. In addition to the background and financial data 
information that you just viewed (you can click the links to review the background 
information and historical financial information), you also have EJH, Inc.’s 
earnings press release provided below. 
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(Upside/More-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release 
EJH INC. REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 
 
Chipolewa, OH— December 1, 2009— EJH, Inc. today reported financial results for the fiscal 
year ended September 30, 2009.  The company reported net income of $10.2 million, or $1.38 
per share, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009, compared to net income of $12.5 million, 
or $1.61 per share, for the fiscal year ended in September 30, 2008.   
 
 
Fiscal year ended September 30, 2008 and 2009 
(all figures in millions except for EPS) 
 
  
2009 
 
2008 
   
Revenue $106.0 $122.0 
Cost of Sales 53.9 61.6 
Gross Profit 52.1 60.4 
Other Expenses 41.9 47.9 
Net Income $10.2 $12.5 
 
 
 
 
   2009 
 
   2008 
EPS $1.38 $1.61 
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(Upside/More-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
Long Term Business Outlook 
 
EJH, Inc. today announced earnings guidance of $1.63 per share for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2010.  This estimate is $0.25 above the reported earnings per share of $1.38 for 
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009. 
 
Leonard White, EJH Inc.’s Chairman and CEO, explained that the forecast assumes that the cost 
of raw materials will at least approximate the current costs. Further cost reduction would 
increase the above estimate of earnings. 
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(Upside/More-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
EJH, Inc., an Ohio-based company, is a world leader in select categories of branded office 
products. It operates in three segments. EJH engages in designing, developing, manufacturing, 
and marketing branded office products.  
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(Downside/More-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
 
 
Instruction 
 
Recall that you are not invested in EJH’s stock. You are researching EJH as a 
potential investment. 
 
It is December 1, 2009. In addition to the background and financial data 
information that you just viewed (you can click the links to review the background 
information and historical financial information), you also have EJH, Inc.’s 
earnings press release provided below. 
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(Downside/More-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release 
EJH INC. REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 
 
Chipolewa, OH— December 1, 2009— EJH, Inc. today reported financial results for the fiscal 
year ended September 30, 2009.  The company reported net income of $10.2 million, or $1.38 
per share, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009, compared to net income of $12.5 million, 
or $1.61 per share, for the fiscal year ended in September 30, 2008.   
 
 
Fiscal year ended September 30, 2008 and 2009 
(all figures in millions except for EPS) 
 
  
2009 
 
2008 
   
Revenue $106.0 $122.0 
Cost of Sales 53.9 61.6 
Gross Profit 52.1 60.4 
Other Expenses 41.9 47.9 
Net Income $10.2 $12.5 
 
 
 
 
   2009 
 
   2008 
EPS $1.38 $1.61 
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(Downside/More-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
Long Term Business Outlook 
 
EJH, Inc. today announced earnings guidance of $1.63 per share for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2010.  This estimate is $0.25 above the reported earnings per share of $1.38 for 
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009. 
 
Leonard White, EJH Inc.’s Chairman and CEO, explained that the forecast assumes that the cost 
of raw materials will at least approximate the current costs. Further cost increase would reduce 
the above estimate of earnings. 
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(Downside/More-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
EJH, Inc., an Ohio-based company, is a world leader in select categories of branded office 
products. It operates in three segments. EJH engages in designing, developing, manufacturing, 
and marketing branded office products.  
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(Upside/Less-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
 
 
 
Instruction 
 
Recall that you are not invested in EJH’s stock. You are researching EJH as a 
potential investment. 
 
It is December 1, 2009. In addition to the background and financial data 
information that you just viewed (you can click the links to review the background 
information and historical financial information), you also have EJH, Inc.’s 
earnings press release provided below. 
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(Upside/Less-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release 
EJH INC. REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 
 
Chipolewa, OH— December 1, 2009— EJH, Inc. today reported financial results for the fiscal 
year ended September 30, 2009.  The company reported net income of $10.2 million, or $1.38 
per share, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009, compared to net income of $12.5 million, 
or $1.61 per share, for the fiscal year ended in September 30, 2008.   
 
 
Fiscal year ended September 30, 2008 and 2009 
(all figures in millions except for EPS) 
 
  
2009 
 
2008 
   
Revenue $106.0 $122.0 
Cost of Sales 53.9 61.6 
Gross Profit 52.1 60.4 
Other Expenses 41.9 47.9 
Net Income $10.2 $12.5 
 
 
 
 
   2009 
 
   2008 
EPS $1.38 $1.61 
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(Upside/Less-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
 
Long Term Business Outlook 
 
EJH, Inc. today announced earnings guidance of $1.63 per share for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2010.  This estimate is $0.25 above the reported earnings per share of $1.38 for 
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009.  
 
Leonard White, EJH Inc.’s Chairman and CEO, explained that the forecast assumes that the 
macroeconomic environment will at least approximate the current environment. Further 
improvement would increase the above estimate of earnings.
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(Upside/Less-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
EJH, Inc., an Ohio-based company, is a world leader in select categories of branded office 
products. It operates in three segments. EJH engages in designing, developing, manufacturing, 
and marketing branded office products.  
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(Downside/Less-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
 
 
 
Instruction 
 
Recall that you are not invested in EJH’s stock. You are researching EJH as a 
potential investment. 
 
It is December 1, 2009. In addition to the background and financial data 
information that you just viewed (you can click the links to review the background 
information and historical financial information), you also have EJH, Inc.’s 
earnings press release provided below. 
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(Downside/Less-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release 
EJH INC. REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 
 
Chipolewa, OH— December 1, 2009— EJH, Inc. today reported financial results for the fiscal 
year ended September 30, 2009.  The company reported net income of $10.2 million, or $1.38 
per share, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009, compared to net income of $12.5 million, 
or $1.61 per share, for the fiscal year ended in September 30, 2008.   
 
 
Fiscal year ended September 30, 2008 and 2009 
(all figures in millions except for EPS) 
 
  
2009 
 
2008 
   
Revenue $106.0 $122.0 
Cost of Sales 53.9 61.6 
Gross Profit 52.1 60.4 
Other Expenses 41.9 47.9 
Net Income $10.2 $12.5 
 
 
 
 
   2009 
 
   2008 
EPS $1.38 $1.61 
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(Downside/Less-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
 
Long Term Business Outlook 
 
EJH, Inc. today announced earnings guidance of $1.63 per share for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2010.  This estimate is $0.25 above the reported earnings per share of $1.38 for 
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009.  
 
Leonard White, EJH Inc.’s Chairman and CEO, explained that the forecast assumes that the 
macroeconomic environment will at least approximate the current environment. Further 
deterioration would reduce the above estimate of earnings.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 89 
(Downside/Less-Controllable/Close-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
EJH, Inc., an Ohio-based company, is a world leader in select categories of branded office 
products. It operates in three segments. EJH engages in designing, developing, manufacturing, 
and marketing branded office products.  
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(Downside/Less-Controllable/Distant Proximity Condition) 
 
 
 
 
Instruction 
 
Recall that you are not invested in EJH’s stock. You are researching EJH as a 
potential investment. 
 
It is December 1, 2009. In addition to the background and financial data 
information that you just viewed (you can click the links to review the background 
information and historical financial information), you also have EJH, Inc.’s 
earnings press release provided below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
(Downside/Less-Controllable/Distant -Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release 
EJH INC. REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 
 
Chipolewa, OH— December 1, 2009— EJH, Inc. today reported financial results for the fiscal 
year ended September 30, 2009.  The company reported net income of $10.2 million, or $1.38 
per share, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009, compared to net income of $12.5 million, 
or $1.61 per share, for the fiscal year ended in September 30, 2008.   
 
 
Fiscal year ended September 30, 2008 and 2009 
(all figures in millions except for EPS) 
 
  
2009 
 
2008 
   
Revenue $106.0 $122.0 
Cost of Sales 53.9 61.6 
Gross Profit 52.1 60.4 
Other Expenses 41.9 47.9 
Net Income $10.2 $12.5 
 
 
 
 
   2009 
 
   2008 
EPS $1.38 $1.61 
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(Downside/Less-Controllable/ Distant-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
 
Long Term Business Outlook 
 
EJH, Inc. today announced earnings guidance of $1.63 per share for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2010.  This estimate is $0.25 above the reported earnings per share of $1.38 for 
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009.  
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(Downside/Less-Controllable/Distant-Proximity Condition) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
EJH, Inc., an Ohio-based company, is a world leader in select categories of branded office 
products. It operates in three segments. EJH engages in designing, developing, manufacturing, 
and marketing branded office products.  
 
Leonard White, EJH Inc.’s Chairman and CEO, explained that the forecast assumes that the 
macroeconomic environment will at least approximate the current environment. Further 
deterioration would reduce the above estimate of earnings.
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(Control Condition: no supplementary information) 
 
 
 
 
Instruction 
 
Recall that you are not invested in EJH’s stock. You are researching EJH as a 
potential investment. 
 
It is December 1, 2009. In addition to the background and financial data 
information that you just viewed (you can click the links to review the background 
information and historical financial information), you also have EJH, Inc.’s 
earnings press release provided below. 
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(Control Condition: no supplementary information) 
 
December 1 Press Release 
EJH INC. REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 
 
Chipolewa, OH— December 1, 2009— EJH, Inc. today reported financial results for the fiscal 
year ended September 30, 2009.  The company reported net income of $10.2 million, or $1.38 
per share, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009, compared to net income of $12.5 million, 
or $1.61 per share, for the fiscal year ended in September 30, 2008.   
 
 
Fiscal year ended September 30, 2008 and 2009 
(all figures in millions except for EPS) 
 
  
2009 
 
2008 
   
Revenue $106.0 $122.0 
Cost of Sales 53.9 61.6 
Gross Profit 52.1 60.4 
Other Expenses 41.9 47.9 
Net Income $10.2 $12.5 
 
 
 
 
   2009 
 
   2008 
EPS $1.38 $1.61 
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(Control Condition: no supplementary information) 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
 
Long Term Business Outlook 
 
EJH, Inc. today announced earnings guidance of $1.63 per share for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2010.  This estimate is $0.25 above the reported earnings per share of $1.38 for 
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009.  
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(Control Condition: no supplementary information) 
 
 
December 1 Press Release (continued) 
 
EJH, Inc., an Ohio-based company, is a world leader in select categories of branded office 
products. It operates in three segments. EJH engages in designing, developing, manufacturing, 
and marketing branded office products.  
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APPENDIX C: Experimental Questions and Subsequent Disclosure 
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(All Conditions) 
 
 
Instructions 
 
 After reviewing the background information and press release provided 
above for EJH, Inc., please answer the following questions by clicking the 
button that best indicates your judgment. 
 
 You may refer back to the case materials using the links provided with each 
question  
 
 
Q1a:  I believe that the 2010 earnings guidance of $1.63 provided by EJH’s management was _______. 
           
0 
Not at all 
Believable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Believable 
Q1b:  I believe that the long-term business outlook in the December 1 Press Release provided by EJH’s 
management was _______. 
           
0 
Not at all 
Believable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Believable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
(All Conditions) 
 
 
 
INSTRUCTION 
 
Assume now it is February 9, 2010.  EJH, Inc. issued the following 2010 earnings 
guidance update.  
 
 
 
 
Subsequent Additional Information: 2010 earnings guidance update 
 
(BUSINESS WIRE) – February 9, 2010 — EJH, Inc. today announced that it expects to exceed 
its earnings guidance for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010.  This revised estimate $1.65 
is $0.02 above the previous earnings guidance of $1.63. 
 
Q2a:  I believe that the revised 2010 earnings guidance of $1.65 provided by EJH’s management was 
_______. 
           
0 
Not at all 
Believable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Believable 
 
Q2b:  I would ______the 2010 earnings guidance update in evaluating the future prospects of 
EJH, Inc.   
           
0 
Not at all 
rely on 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Much rely 
on 
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(All Conditions) 
 
Instructions 
 The following items solicit your judgments about EJH's management.   
 Please respond to the following items by clicking the button that best indicates your 
judgment. 
 You may refer back to the case materials using the links provided with each question. 
 
Q3:  I believe that EJH’s management is _______. 
           
0 
Not at all 
Credible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Credible 
Q4a:  I believe that EJH’s management is _______. 
           
0 
Not at all 
Trustworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Trustworthy 
Q4b:  I believe that EJH’s management is _______in its disclosures 
           
0 
Not at all 
honest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Honest 
Q4c:  I believe that EJH’s management is _______in its disclosures 
           
0 
Not at all 
Forthcoming 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Forthcoming 
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Q5:  I believe that EJH’s management is _______ at running EJH, Inc.. 
           
0 
Not at all 
competent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Competent 
 
Q6:  I believe that EJH’s management is _______at providing earnings forecast. 
           
0 
Not at all 
competent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Competent 
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(Less-Controllable Conditions) 
 
 
Instructions 
 
 The following items solicit your knowledge of EJH, Inc.   
 Please respond to the items by clicking the button that best indicates your 
judgment. 
 
 
Q7:  In the press release on December 1, 2009, EJH reported information about the 
________that could affect the company’s earnings forecasts. 
1. cost of raw materials that could increase the company’s earnings forecast 
2. cost of raw materials that could decrease the company’s earnings forecast 
3. macroeconomic environment that could increase the company’s earnings forecast 
4. macroeconomic environment that could decrease the company’s earnings forecast 
5. I do not recall any information related to the cost or the macroeconomic environment    
Q8:  I believe that the potential changes of the macroeconomic environment discussed by EJH’s 
management was _______.   
           
0 
Not at all 
likely to 
occur 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
likely to 
occur 
 
Q9:  To what extent did the potential changes of the macroeconomic environment discussed by 
EJH’s management play a role in your credibility judgment?   
           
0 
Not at all 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
To a large 
extent 
 
 
 104 
Q10:  To what extent do you think that EJH’s management can take actions to control for the potential 
changes of the macroeconomic environment?   
           
0 
Not at all 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
To a large 
extent 
 
Q11a:  To what extent do you think that whether EJH’s management can control for the potential changes 
of the macroeconomic environment reflects the management’s competence? 
           
0 
Not at all 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
To a large 
extent 
Q11b:  To what extent do you think that whether EJH’s management can control for the potential change 
of the macroeconomic environment reflects the management’s trustworthiness?   
           
0 
Not at all 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
To a large 
extent 
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(More-Controllable Conditions) 
 
 
Instructions 
 
 The following items solicit your knowledge of EJH, Inc.   
 Please respond to the items by clicking the button that best indicates your 
judgment. 
 
 
Q7:  In the press release on December 1, 2009, EJH reported information about the 
________that could affect the company’s earnings forecasts. 
6. cost of raw materials that could increase the company’s earnings forecast 
7. cost of raw materials that could decrease the company’s earnings forecast 
8. macroeconomic environment that could increase the company’s earnings forecast 
9. macroeconomic environment that could decrease the company’s earnings forecast 
10. I do not recall any information related to the cost or the macroeconomic environment    
Q8:  I believe that the potential changes of the material costs discussed by EJH’s management was 
_______.   
           
0 
Not at all 
likely to 
occur 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
likely to 
occur 
 
Q9:  To what extent did the potential changes of the material costs discussed by EJH’s management play 
a role in your credibility judgment?   
           
0 
Not at all 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
To a large 
extent 
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Q10:  To what extent do you think that EJH’s management can take actions to control for the potential 
changes of the material costs?   
           
0 
Not at all 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
To a large 
extent 
 
Q11a:  To what extent do you think that whether EJH’s management can control for the potential changes 
of the material costs reflects the management’s competence? 
           
0 
Not at all 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
To a large 
extent 
Q11b:  To what extent do you think that whether EJH’s management can control for the potential change 
of the material costs reflects the management’s trustworthiness?   
           
0 
Not at all 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
To a large 
extent 
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(All Conditions) 
 
Instructions 
 
 The following items solicit your judgments about EJH's disclosure.   
 Please respond to the items by clicking the button that best indicates your 
judgment. 
 
Q12a:  To what extent do you believe the 2009 financial results reported in the 2009 earnings 
press release to be good or bad news? 
           
0 
Very bad 
news 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Good news 
 
Q12b:  To what extent do you believe the Long-term business outlook provided by EJH’s 
management to be good or bad news? 
           
0 
Very bad 
news 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
Good news 
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(All Conditions) 
 
Instructions 
 
 Please respond to the following items by clicking the button that best 
indicates your judgment of the current economy. 
 
 
 
 
Q13:  To what extent do you think the current macroeconomic environment will improve, 
remain the same, or deteriorate over the next 12 months? 
           
0 
Deteriorate 
1 2 3 4 5 
Remain 
the 
same 
6 7 8 9 10 
Improve 
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(All Conditions) 
 
Instructions 
 
 The following questions solicit your demographic information  
 Please answer the following questions by clicking the button or filling the 
blank, as specifically required. 
 
 
 
 
Q14a:  How many accounting courses have you taken, including the courses in which you are currently 
enrolled?  
(Fill in the blank here) __________  
            
 
Q14b:  How many finance courses have you taken, including the courses in which you are currently 
enrolled?  
(Fill in the blank here) __________  
 
 
Q15:  Have you taken a course where financial statement analysis was a primary focus?  
1.  Yes. I took it prior to this semester. 
2.  Yes. I am taking it this semester. 
3.   No. I have never taken one.  
 
 
Q16: How many times have you evaluated a company’s performance by analyzing its financial 
statements? 
 
__________ 1.  this is the first time 
__________ 2.  1 – 5 times 
__________ 3.  6 – 10 times 
__________ 4.  more than 10 times 
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Q17a:  Have you ever bought or sold an individual company’s common stock or debt securities either 
individually or through a mutual or pension fund? 
  
 ______ 1.  Yes 
  ______ 2.  No 
 
Q17b.  If yes in Q17a, approximately how many times? ___________   
 
 
Q18:  Do you plan to invest in an individual company’s common stock or debt securities in the next five 
years? 
 
 ______ 1.  Yes 
  ______ 2.  No 
 
 
Q19a: Which program are you enrolled in at University of Illinois? 
 
__________ 1.  Master of Business Administration – Full-Time 
__________ 2.  Master of Business Administration – Part-Time 
__________ 3.  Master of Business Administration/Law (MBA/JD)  
__________ 4.  Master of Science in Finance (MSF) 
__________ 5.  Other _____________________________ 
 
Q19b: If you are enrolled in the Master of Business Administration, are you a 1
st
 year or 2
nd
 year student? 
 
__________ 1.  First-year student 
__________ 2.  Second-year student 
__________ 3. other ____________ 
 
 
You are done! 
Thanks for your participation.  
 
 
You may click the continue button to exit.  
Have a good day! 
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FIGURE 1
 a
: Theoretical Models in Two-Sided Literature in Marketing
 
 
 
Panel A:  Attribution Theory Model  
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Optimal Arousal Theory Model                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a
 Figure 1 presents three theoretical models that explain the underlying mechanisms in two-sided studies in 
marketing literature. All three models are adapted from Crowley and Hoyer (1994) and Eisend (2007).   
Perceived  
Novelty 
Attitude 
towards 
Brand 
  
F 
   
Two-sided  
Message 
 B 
D Attitude  
towards  
Advertisement 
C 
Attention  
and Motivation  
to Process  
Message A 
E 
Source 
Credibility 
Attitude  
towards 
Advertiser 
   
   
Two-sided  
Message 
 B 
C 
Attitude  
towards  
Brand 
Attitude  
towards  
Advertisement 
D 
A 
 113 
FIGURE 1 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel C:  Inoculation Theory Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attitude  
towards Brand 
  
F 
   
 
Two-sided  
Message 
With  
Refutation 
 
B 
C 
Negative 
Cognitive 
Response 
D 
Attention  
and Motivation  
to Process  
Message 
A 
E 
G 
Positive 
Cognitive 
Response 
 114 
FIGURE 2: Credibility Framework in Prior Accounting Literature 
 
 
Panel A:  Factors that Influence Disclosure Credibility (Mercer 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Determinants and Consequences of Management Credibility (Mercer 2005) 
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FIGURE 3
 a
:  Expected Model for My Predictions (Hypothesis Two) 
b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a
 Figure 3 presents a summary of predicted and observed relationships in participants’ judgments in the two 
controllability conditions. Controllability = dummy variable with value equal to 0 (1) indicating downside 
supplementary information describes macroenvironment (material costs) condition that is less (more) controllable by 
management.  
b
 Participants provided judgment of management forthcomingness by responding to the following: ―I believe that 
EJH’s management is ______in its disclosure,‖ using an 11 point-scale anchored on 0 (―not at all forthcoming‖) and 
10 (―very forthcoming‖).  Participants provided judgment of management credibility by responding to the following: 
―I believe that EJH’s management is ______,‖ using an 11 point-scale anchored on 0 (―not at all credible‖) and 10 
(―very credible‖).  Participants provided judgment of forecast credibility by responding to the following: ―I believe 
that the 2010 earnings guidance of $1.63 provided by EJH’s management was ______,‖ using an 11 point-scale 
anchored on 0 (―not at all believable‖) and 10 (―very believable‖).   
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FIGURE 4: Credibility Judgments of Good News Management Earnings Forecasts
 a
 
 
Panel A:  Mean of forecast credibility judgments (Hypothesis One) 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Mean of forecast credibility judgments (Hypothesis Two) 
 
                                                 
a
 Participants judged the credibility of the company’s good news earnings forecast using an 11-point Likert-type 
scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very believable.  
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FIGURE 4 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel C:  Observed model 
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TABLE 1: CREDIBILITY ENHANCEMENT OF DOWNSIDE INFORMATION  
a
 
(H1 and H2: main analysis) 
 
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] of Credibility Judgment of Good News Earnings Forecast  
 
 Upside 
information 
b
 
Downside 
information 
Total 
More-controllable 
supplementary 
information 
c
  
4.58 
[2.57] 
N = 19 
4.45 
[2.54] 
N = 20 
4.51 
[2.52] 
N = 39 
 
Less-controllable 
supplementary 
information 
 
3.84 
[2.27] 
N = 19 
 
5.70 
[2.49] 
N = 20 
 
4.77 
[2.38] 
N = 39 
 
Column Mean 4.21 
[2.42] 
N = 38 
5.08 
[2.56] 
N = 40 
4.65 
[2.52] 
N = 78 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Overall ANOVA 
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
d
 
Valence  1 14.56 2.38 0.06 (1T) 
Controllability  1 1.28 0.21 0.33 (1T) 
Valence * Controllability 1 19.23 3.15 0.08 (2T) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a
 Participants judged the credibility of the company’s good news earnings forecast using an 11-point Likert-type 
scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very believable.  
b
 Upside (downside) information refers to a good news forecast accompanied by upside (downside) supplementary 
information that may increase (decrease) the forecast. 
c
 The information controllability refers to the fact that a good news forecast is supplemented by information that 
either discusses factors less controllable by management (i.e., macro economic environment) or more controllable 
by management (i.e., material costs).   
d
 One-tailed p-values are labeled (1T).  Two-tailed p-values are labeled (2T).   
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) 
 
 
Panel C:  Simple Main Effect 
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
e
 
Investors judged higher forecast credibility when 
receiving supplementary information about a less 
controllable factor that indicates downside 
information as compared to upside information  
 
 
1 33.63 5.91 0.01 
Investors’ forecast credibility judgment is not 
significantly different when receiving 
supplementary information about a more 
controllable factor that indicates downside 
information as compared to upside information  
 
 
 
1 0.16 0.02 0.44 
Investors judged higher forecast credibility when 
receiving downside supplementary information 
that discusses a less controllable factor as 
compared to a more controllable factor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 15.63 2.46 0.06 
 
                                                 
e
 Given my directional prediction, p-value shown is one-tailed. 
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TABLE 2: CREDIBILITY ENHANCEMENT OF DOWNSIDE INFORMATION
 a
  
(H1: Additional analysis with control condition) 
 
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] of Credibility Judgment of Good News Earnings Forecast  
 
 Total 
 
Upside  
information 
b
 
4.21 
[2.42] 
N = 38 
 
 
Downside 
information  
 
 
 
Control condition 
 
 
 
 
 
5.08 
[2.56] 
        N = 40 
 
         4.58 
[2.09] 
N = 19 
 
Column Mean 4.64 
[2.42] 
N = 97 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Overall ANOVA 
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
d
 
Valence 2 7.32 1.25 0.15 (1T) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a
 Participants judged the credibility of the company’s good news earnings forecast using an 11-point Likert-type 
scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very believable.  
b
 Upside (downside) information refers to a good news forecast accompanied by upside (downside) supplementary 
information that may increase (decrease) the forecast. 
c
 The information controllability refers to the fact that a good news forecast is supplemented by information that 
either discusses factors less controllable by management (i.e., macroeconomic environment) or more controllable by 
management (i.e., material costs).   
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel C:  Simple Main Effect  
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
e
 
Investors’ forecast credibility judgment is not 
significantly different when receiving downside 
information as compared to a control condition  
 
 
1 3.17 0.54 0.23 
Investors’ forecast credibility judgment is not 
significantly different when receiving upside 
information as compared to a control condition  
 
1 1.72 0.32 0.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
e
 Given my directional prediction, p-value shown is one-tailed. 
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TABLE 3: CREDIBILITY ENHANCEMENT OF DOWNSIDE INFORMATION
 a
  
(H2: Additional analysis with control condition) 
 
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] of Credibility Judgment of Good News Earnings Forecast  
 
 Upside 
information 
b
 
Downside 
information 
Total 
More-controllable 
supplementary 
information 
c
  
4.57 
[2.57] 
N = 19 
4.45 
[2.54] 
N = 20 
4.51 
[2.52] 
N = 39 
 
Less-controllable 
supplementary 
information 
 
 
Control condition 
 
 
 
 
3.84 
[2.27] 
N = 19 
 
5.70 
[2.49] 
N = 20 
 
4.77 
[2.38] 
N = 39 
 
         4.58 
[2.09] 
N = 19 
 
Column Mean 4.21 
[2.42] 
N = 38 
5.08 
[2.56] 
N = 40 
4.64 
[2.42] 
N = 97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a
 Participants judged the credibility of the company’s good news earnings forecast using an 11-point Likert-type 
scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very believable.  
b
 Upside (downside) information refers to a good news forecast accompanied by upside (downside) supplementary 
information that may increase (decrease) the forecast. 
c
 The information controllability refers to the fact that a good news forecast is supplemented by information that 
either discusses factors less controllable by management (i.e., macro economic environment) or more controllable 
by management (i.e., material costs).   
d
 One-tailed p-values are labeled (1T).  Two-tailed p-values are labeled (2T).   
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel B:  Simple Main Effect  
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
e
 
Investors’ forecast credibility judgment is 
significantly higher when receiving downside 
information that is less-controllable as compared to 
receiving no supplementary information (a control 
condition) 
 
 
1 12.25 2.30 0.07 
Investors’ forecast credibility judgment is not 
significantly different when receiving downside 
information that is more-controllable as compared 
to receiving no supplementary information (a 
control condition) 
 
 
1 0.16 0.03 0.43 
Investors’ forecast credibility judgment is 
significantly higher when receiving upside 
information that is less-controllable as compared to 
receiving no supplementary information (a control 
condition) 
 
 
1 5.16 1.08 0.15 
Investors’ forecast credibility judgment is not 
significantly different when receiving upside 
information that is more-controllable as compared 
to receiving no supplementary information (a 
control condition) 
 
 
1 0.00 0.00 0.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
e
 Given my directional prediction, p-value shown is one-tailed. 
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TABLE 4: PERSISTENCE OF CREDIBILITY ENHANCEMENT OF DOWNSIDE 
INFORMATION: CREDIBILITY JUDGMENT OF SUBSEQUENT 
DISCLOSURE 
a
 
 
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] of Credibility Judgment of Subsequent Disclosure  
 
 Upside 
information 
b
 
Downside 
information 
Total 
More-controllable 
supplementary 
information 
c
  
5.58 
[2.39] 
N = 19 
5.60 
[2.28] 
N = 20 
5.58 
[2.30] 
N = 39 
 
Less-controllable 
supplementary 
information 
 
5.16 
[2.06] 
N = 19 
 
6.80 
[1.88] 
N = 20 
 
6.00 
[2.12] 
N = 39 
 
Column Mean 5.37 
[2.21] 
N = 38 
6.20 
[2.15] 
N = 40 
5.79 
[2.21] 
N = 78 
 
                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                 
Panel B:  Overall ANOVA 
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
d
 
Valence  1 13.47 2.89 0.05 (1T) 
Controllability  1 2.96 0.63 0.22 (1T) 
Valence * Controllability 1 12.80 2.74 0.05 (2T) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a
 Participants judged the credibility of the company’s good news earnings forecast using an 11-point Likert-type 
scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very believable.  
b
 Upside (downside) information refers to a good news forecast accompanied by upside (downside) supplementary 
information that may increase (decrease) the forecast. 
c
 The information controllability refers to the fact that a good news forecast is supplemented by information that 
either discusses factors less controllable by management (i.e., macro economic environment) or more controllable 
by management (i.e., material costs).   
d
 One-tailed p-values are labeled (1T).  Two-tailed p-values are labeled (2T).   
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TABLE 4 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel C:  Simple Main Effect 
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
e
 
Investors in the less-controllable condition view a 
subsequent disclosure as more credible when 
receiving the downside information as compared to 
the upside information  
 
 
1 26.27 6.76 0.01 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
e
 Given my directional prediction, p-value shown is one-tailed. 
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TABLE 5: PERSISTENCE OF CREDIBILITY ENHANCEMENT OF DOWNSIDE 
INFORMATION: RELIANCE ON SUBSEQUENT DISCLOSURE  
a
 
 
Panel A: Mean Judgment [Standard Deviation] of Reliance on Subsequent Disclosure  
 
 Upside 
information 
b
 
Downside 
information 
Total 
More-controllable 
supplementary 
information 
c
  
5.32 
[2.29] 
N = 19 
4.70 
[2.43] 
N = 20 
5.00 
[2.35] 
N = 39 
 
Less-controllable 
supplementary 
information 
 
4.58 
[2.17] 
N = 19 
 
6.20 
[1.94] 
N = 20 
 
5.41 
[2.19] 
N = 39 
 
Column Mean 4.95 
[2.23] 
N = 38 
5.45 
[2.30] 
N = 40 
5.21 
[2.26] 
N = 78 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
Panel B:  Overall ANOVA 
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
d
 
Valence  1 4.93 1.01 0.16(1T) 
Controllability  1 2.84 0.58 0.22 (1T) 
Valence * Controllability 1 24.38 4.98 0.01 (2T) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a
 Participants judged the credibility of the company’s good news earnings forecast using an 11-point Likert-type 
scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very believable.  
b
 Upside (downside) information refers to a good news forecast accompanied by upside (downside) supplementary 
information that may increase (decrease) the forecast. 
c
 The information controllability refers to the fact that a good news forecast is supplemented by information that 
either discusses factors less controllable by management (i.e., macro economic environment) or more controllable 
by management (i.e., material costs).   
d
 One-tailed p-values are labeled (1T).  Two-tailed p-values are labeled (2T).   
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel C:  Simple Main Effect 
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
e
 
Investors in the less-controllable condition rely 
more on a subsequent disclosure when receiving 
the downside information as compared to the 
upside information  
 
1 25.60 6.08 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
e
 Given my directional prediction, p-value shown is one-tailed. 
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TABLE 6: PROXIMITY AND CREDIBILITY ENHANCEMENT   
 
Panel A:  Mean [Standard Deviation] of Credibility Judgment of Positive Earnings Forecast 
 
 Close 
proximity 
Distant 
proximity 
Total 
Less- 
controllable 
downside 
information 
4.80 
[1.94] 
N = 20 
5.70 
[2.49] 
N = 20 
5.25 
[2.25] 
N = 40 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Overall ANOVA 
 
 
 
Source df 
Mean Square F-Statistic p-Value
†
 
Proximity  1 8.10 1.63 0.105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 Participants judged the credibility of the company’s good news earnings forecast using an 11-point Likert-type 
scale, anchored on 0= Not at all believable and 10= Very believable.  
†
 Given my directional prediction, p-value shown is one-tailed. 
